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In the first chapter I study racial differences in the impact of education on labor 
income volatility.  Using panel data on black and white males from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics I find that education reduces labor income volatility more for 
blacks than for whites.  The central specifications indicate that college graduation 
reduces transitory labor income volatility by more than 65 percent relative to high 
school dropouts for blacks, whereas whites receive no statistically significant 
reduction.  I also find that more risk averse blacks obtain more education while more 
risk averse whites do not.  I argue that these results imply: (1) that precautionary 
demand for human capital is quantitatively important; and (2) the black differential 
investment puzzle can be explained by accounting for racial differences in the impact 
of education on exposure to labor income volatility.  The results can be explained by 
the precision of employer’s beliefs about a worker’s productivity increasing more 
with education for blacks, so that more-skilled blacks face less labor income 
volatility.  
  
Participants, like econometricians, may have difficulty in constructing the 
counterfactual outcome required to estimate the impact of a program.  In the second 
chapter, this question is directly assessed by examining the extent to which program 
participants are able to estimate their individual program impacts ex-post.  Utilizing 
experimental data from the National Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) Study 
(NJS) experimentally estimated program impacts are compared to individual self-
reports of program effectiveness after the completion of the program.  Two methods 
are implemented to estimate the individual experimental impacts based on: (1) 
subgroup variation; (2) the assumption of perfect rank correlation in impacts.  Little 
evidence of a relationship between the experimentally estimated program impacts and 
self-reported program effectiveness is found.  There is evidence found that 
cognitively inexpensive potential proxies for program impacts such as before-after 
differences in earnings, the type of training received, and labor market outcomes are 
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Economists consider education decisions primarily as an investment.  Individuals 
acquire education until the benefit of obtaining additional education is less than the 
cost.  The benefit of education is that the acquired skills allow individuals to be able 
to sell their labor at a higher price.  Education requires time and effort to acquire, 
however, making it a costly investment.  This simple framework based on 
deterministic costs and benefits of education forms the basis for the standard model of 
educational investment.  I build upon recent findings of the determinants of financial 
investments, and the psychology of assessing the impact of interventions to provide a 
richer view of the incentives to invest in education.  The two essays that form this 
dissertation consider the role of uncertainty in determining incentives to invest in 
education.  They differ in the timing of the measurement of the uncertainty 
concerning when the benefits of education.  The first essay examines ex-ante 
uncertainty, whereas the second measures ex-post uncertainty. 
 
In the first essay I investigate the idea that individual education decisions are 
influenced by how uncertain the benefits from education might be.  Existing evidence 
shows that the amount of labor income uncertainty that individuals expect to face is 
an important determinant of financial investment decisions.  Thus, a key motive for 
financial wealth holding is to reduce exposure to labor income uncertainty.  If 
education investment decisions are made in a similar fashion then this motive should 




benefits if labor income uncertainty falls with education acquisition.  I examine this 
idea by estimating whether there are differences across race in the effect of education 
on labor income volatility.  I find that education significantly reduces labor income 
volatility for blacks, but not for whites.  This implies that education is more valuable 
for blacks than is implied by the simple rate of return to education for blacks.  In 
addition, I find that more risk averse blacks obtain more education, but that this is not 
true for whites.  This finding offers a possible explanation for the puzzle that blacks 
obtain more education (conditional on test scores) than whites, even though the rate 
of return to education does not differ by race.  Thus, the incorporation of uncertainty 
into the standard model of the investment in education provides an explanation for a 
previously unexplained puzzle in the economics of education. 
 
The second essay examines to what extent individuals are able to assess whether a job 
training program they have just completed had a positive impact on their labor 
income.  The central question here is whether individuals can accurately construct the 
counterfactual experiment of what would have happened to them if they had or had 
not received an intervention.  In this case, the intervention is the receipt of job 
training.  If an individual is able to accurately construct this counterfactual then they 
are able to estimate their true benefit of a participating in the program.  However, 
constructing a counterfactual for a job training program is a cognitively difficult task. 
The individual has to be able to assess exactly what outcome they would have had if 
they did not participate.  The question of how well individuals are able to evaluate a 




evaluations of the programs' effectiveness are correlated with experimentally 
estimated predicted program impacts.  If individuals are able to accurately construct 
the counterfactual outcome, the experimentally estimated predicted impacts will be 
strongly related to the participants' self-assessment of the program.  The results show 
that there is little evidence for a correlation between the predicted impact and the self-
assessment of the individual.  This suggests that individuals either have different 
assessments of what is valuable about a program than administrators, or they are 
unable to construct counterfactuals well.  In addition, evidence that participant self-
assessments are correlated with easy-to-observe potential program impact proxies is 
found.  This suggests that individuals do have trouble constructing counterfactual 
outcomes.  In sum, this essay shows that program participants face substantial 
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Chapter 1: Racial Differences in the Insurance Value of Education 
 
1.1 Introduction 
For labor income uncertainty to alter incentives to invest in education, two conditions 
must hold.  First, labor income uncertainty must not be completely insurable.  If this is 
the case fluctuations in labor income will result in fluctuations in consumption, leading to 
a loss of welfare for risk averse individuals.  Cochrane (1991) and Attanasio and Davis 
(1996) are two highly influential empirical papers showing that idiosyncratic labor 
income uncertainty is not fully insurable.1  Second, exposure to labor income risk must be 
affected by the accumulation of education.  If acquiring education reduces exposure to 
labor income uncertainty then education will be more valuable than its impact on mean 
income alone would indicate.  Some evidence suggests that education has a stronger 
negative relationship with unemployment for blacks than for whites, suggesting that 
accounting for labor income uncertainty may make education differentially more valuable 
for blacks if these employment patterns affect uncertainty about labor income.2   
This chapter uses data on black and white males from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) to measure whether the education-labor income volatility gradient is 
                                                 
1 While racial differences in the impact of idiosyncratic labor income risk on consumption have not been 
studied, it seems likely that it is more difficult for blacks to insure consumption than whites given the stark 
racial differences in wealth. 
2  Neal (2005) finds that the slope of the relationship between education and unemployment is more 
negative for blacks than for whites.  Bound and Freedman (1992) find that during the 1980s black high 
school dropouts experienced more severe employment shocks than more-skilled blacks did.  In terms of 
incarceration the estimates presented in Morretti and Lochner (2004) find that the point estimates of the 
impact of education on incarceration are larger for blacks.  But because the underlying average levels of 
incarceration are much higher for blacks it does not seem like blacks experience larger impacts of 




different by race.  I measure the impact of education on the variance of transitory shocks 
to total labor and social insurance income for both whites and blacks.   The central 
finding is that education reduces labor income volatility more for blacks than for whites.  
Black college graduates reduce labor income volatility by more than 65 percent relative 
to high school dropouts, whereas whites receive no statistically significant reduction.  I 
show that these results are robust to addressing the endogeneity of education with respect 
to both preferences for risk and ability, and including measuring labor income in ways 
that take account of labor force participation, social insurance and taxation.  In a separate 
analysis of racial differences in the demand for education I find that risk aversion is 
positively related to education for blacks, but not for whites.  Taken together these results 
are consistent with the notion that education reduces labor income volatility more for 
blacks than for whites and precautionary motives are quantitatively important in 
determining educational investments. 
The central motivation for this study is to understand whether the riskiness of of 
the returns to educational investments influences individual educational investment 
decisions.  Recently, a number of empirical papers have carefully estimated the riskiness 
of returns to education.3  The results presented show that education is at least a somewhat 
risky investment.  That is, education does affect an individuals labor income uncertainty.  
This reduction in labor income uncertainty will influence educational investment 
decisions if precautionary demand for education is important.  There has been a large and 
influential macro literature showing that precautionary motives are important in 
                                                 
3  See Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997), Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2002), Charles and Louh 
(2003), Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003), Palacios-Huerta (2003), Chen (2004), Heckman, Lochner 




explaining financial wealth holding.4  Those who expect more labor income risk hold 
more financial wealth.  However, there is no evidence of a precautionary motive in the 
demand for education at this point. 
Previous work on the riskiness of educational investments has not tested for 
precautionary motives because they have not had the power to complete the test with the 
data sources that they use.  This lack of power comes from two sources.  First, these 
papers do not generally consider cross-section variation across individuals in the riskiness 
of human capital.5 In other words they do not measure who is supplied with educational 
labor income insurance.  Second, they are unable estimate the relationship between 
preferences for risk and educational attainment.  That is, they do not test whether 
individual demand for education is sensitive to educational labor income insurance.   
To conduct a powerful test for precautionary demand for education we must 
know: (1) whose exposure to labor income volatility is affected by education (the supply 
of labor income insurance arising from education) and (2) whether risk averse individuals 
who can reduce their labor income volatility by acquiring more education in fact do so 
(that is, whether the demand for education is sensitive to labor income insurance).  In my 
case both requirements are satisfied.  Race is an individual endowment that is fixed over 
time, so I am able to estimate if there are racial differences in the supply of educational 
labor income insurance.  Because I have access to a survey-based measure of preferences 
for risk for individuals in the PSID, I am able to examine if risk averse individuals who 
                                                 
4 See Carroll and Samwick (1997), Engen and Gruber (2001), Dynan, Skinner, Zeldes (2004) and Fuchs-
Schundeln and Schundeln (2005).  
5 Palacios-Huerta (2003), and Sykt Nielsen and Vissing-Jorgensen (2005) do think carefully about the 
cross-sectional distribution of human capital risk.  However, they lack access to a risk preference measures 




are likely to reduce their exposure to labor income risk by acquiring education (based on 
their race) do in fact obtain more education.  
Education may affect two sources of labor income uncertainty differentially by 
race.  Uncertainty about shocks to an individual’s actual productivity in a given period 
may be affected by education.  Education could have a causal effect on the probability 
that an individual becomes disabled for example.  The tasks that less-skilled individuals 
do in their jobs are more physically demanding, and more likely to result in a significant 
injury.  The benefits of education in reducing the labor supplied to jobs with significant 
injury risk may well differ by race.  Other sources of these shocks could be incarceration 
or shocks to productivity in sectors where employment is disproportionately concentrated 
in a certain race or skill group.  I discuss the evidence on the relationship between 
education and productivity shocks in more detail in what follows. 
The other source of labor income uncertainty is due to imperfect information in 
the labor market.  When a worker is initially hired at job they will be paid according to 
their expected marginal product based upon their observable characteristics.  As 
employers observe the output of a given worker over time they are able to learn about the 
true ability of the worker and change their wage accordingly.  When all workers are also 
exposed to productivity shocks the employer faces a signal extraction process in 
determining whether a observed change in the output of a worker provides information 
about the workers productivity or only reflects the realization of a productivity shock.  
The optimal signal extraction process that the employer will utilize depends on how 
much variance there is in terms of ability and the shock process in the observable group.  




contained in an output realization is.  If heterogeneity in ability falls with education for 
blacks, revisions to their wages will be less related to output realizations.  Thus their 
wages will be less related to actual productivity shocks and their labor income will be 
less volatile.    
The chapter unfolds as follows.  The next section introduces a simple model of 
the demand for education when labor income volatility is uninsurable.  Section 1.3 
outlines the data to be used.  In Section 1.4 racial differences in the relationship between 
education and labor income volatility are examined.  Section 1.5 studies whether the 
relationship between risk preferences and education differs by race.  Section 1.6 
concludes. 
 
1.2 Labor Income Uncertainty and Investment in Education  
To fix ideas, I present a stylized model of investment in education where markets for 
labor income risk sharing are incomplete in this section.  When markets for labor income 
risk sharing are incomplete, education will have additional benefits beyond the effect on 
permanent income if education reduces the volatility of the labor income process.  The 
model shows that the insurance elasticity of demand is positively related to risk aversion.   
The model is not strictly comparable to Mincerian model of education but does 
maintain some of the standard elements of this framework.  Education increases the mean 
level of permanent income individuals receive each period.  Education is also costly to 
acquire.  Individuals from more disadvantaged family backgrounds and those with lower 
levels of previously acquired skills face larger non-pecuniary costs of acquiring 




which force departure from the Mincerian framework.  Individuals have no access to 
capital markets or storage technologies.6  I also assume that education takes no time to 
acquire, so that there is no opportunity cost of educational investment, and that 
investments in education are irreversible.   
 
1.2.1 An Illustrative Model 
I now consider how this insurance value of education for blacks will influence the 
demand for education when markets for risk sharing are incomplete.  Consider an 
individual making an irreversible decision about which of two income streams to select.7  
The expected utility of a given income stream depends on the level of permanent income, 
the volatility of the income stream, and the individual's preferences for risk.  Each 
income stream has a variance and a level of permanent income that are constant over 
time.   
The individual chooses between two different discrete levels of education, H and 
L, in order to maximize his expected utility at time zero.  Thus, the value of education is  
NPCVEVEV LHED −−= 00 ,       (1.1) 
where NPC is the non-pecuniary cost of acquiring education.  Individuals accumulate 
education level H if NPCVEVE LH ≥− 00 .  There is no discounting, there are two periods.  
The period utility function is of the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) family and 
                                                 
6 This stark assumption is useful to model the implications of uninsurable labor income risk.  The price of 
this assumption is that the link between the interest rate and marginal investments in education, which is a 
prominent feature of the Mincerian model, is lost.  This is however a common assumption used to maintain 
tractability in models of uninsurable labor income risk (see Benabou (2002), Carnerio, Hansen and 
Heckman (2003) and Bertola (2004)). 
7 The basic structure of the model is based largely on Cabellero (1991).  The model is also similar in spirit 




is given by: tce θ
θ
−−1 , where θ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.  The individual 
faces an i.i.d. stochastic stream of labor income yt that is log-normally distributed with a 
mean Y and a variance σ2.  Because there is no storage technology the individual sets ct 
equal to yt in each period.  Thus, the expected utility of the income stream (exploiting the 

















⎛ −== YYyuEVE t .   (1.2) 
Substituting (1.2) into (1.1) for each educational level the expected annual value of 
education is 









σσθ .     (1.3) 
This equation decomposes the annualized value of education into three terms.  The first 
term contains the gain in expected permanent labor income due to education.  The second 
term reflects the annualized non-pecuniary cost of education.  The third term in (1.3) 
reflects the insurance value of education.  If ΨED is positive, education reduces exposure 
to labor income volatility.  However, if ΨED is negative, then education increases 
exposure to labor income volatility.  ΨED enters multiplicatively in θ, the degree of risk 
aversion, which affects the value of this insurance for a given individual.  If education 
reduces exposure to labor income volatility, then the most risk averse individuals will 
place the highest value on this component.  These individuals will demand the most 
education if it provides labor income insurance. 
In addition, equation (1.3) shows why it is important to consider an individual's 




volatility of labor income.8  Individuals who really dislike risk will, on the margin, be 
willing to pay more to obtain education if it provides labor income insurance.  These 
individuals may also make other labor market decisions to reduce labor income volatility 
(perhaps based on the compensation structure of a job or the likelihood of involuntary 
unemployment) that are unobservable to the econometrician.  Thus, any test for the 
impact of education on labor income volatility must control for risk preferences.9  This is 
a key concern in testing for precautionary savings motives for the holding of financial 
wealth, as noted by Fuchs-Schundeln and Schundeln (2005).   
Since the model does not allow individuals either to self-insure against volatility 
by the accumulation of financial wealth or to borrow in bad times it is important to be 
clear about what this implies for how the structure of the labor income process will be 
related to educational decisions.  With this set up the distinction between permanent and 
transitory shocks to labor income in terms of the welfare lost due to volatility is not as 
important.  The demand for education will not be a function of the composition of the 
shock process in terms of persistent or transitory shocks as long as the total amount of 
volatility is not affected.  However, if individuals are able to accumulate buffer stocks or 
borrow this would not be the case.  In this case transitory shocks to labor income are 
                                                 
8 Consider another application of (3).  Instead of an individual choosing between two levels of education, 
the individual chooses between two occupations.  Each occupation has a different expected income level 
and volatility of earnings, and acquiring the skills for occupational qualification is costly.  Rearranging 






















Y .       (1.4) 
 
In equation (1.4) variance σj2 is the volatility of earnings in occupation j, and ΔY10 is the gain in permanent 
income, and C10 is the cost of the occupation change from occupation 0 to occupation 1.  The more an 
individual dislikes risk the more likely he will select into occupations with lower earnings volatility (job 1 
here) all else equal. 
9 If education and preferences for risk were perfectly correlated however it would be impossible to 




much easier to insure than permanent shocks, so that the composition of the shock 
process will affect education demand.  Labor income volatility arising from permanent 
shocks to labor income would affect the demand for education more than uncertainty 
about transitory shocks.  Because the model does not allow for asset accumulation or 
borrowing I will focus on the composition of the shock process, and instead focus only on 
transitory shocks to labor income. 
While this highly stylized model is primarily designed to illustrate how racial 
differences in the insurance value of education will affect education demand it can still 
match the basic facts concerning racial differences in education.  When the cost of 
acquiring education is much larger for blacks, perhaps due to coming from a more 
disadvantaged background on average (as previous work by Neal and Johnson (1996) and 
Cameron and Heckman (2001) has found), the model can explain why blacks acquire less 
education on average.  In addition, the model can explain why conditional on family 
background blacks acquire more education than whites, even though the measured 
average internal rate of return to education is roughly the same by race (as previous work 
by Rivkin (1995), Black and Sufi (2002), and Lang and Manove (2005) has found).  
Because blacks receive an insurance benefit of education, they will acquire more 
education holding costs and the internal rate of return fixed.  The interpretation of this 
fact as a puzzle depends on the whether the average measured internal rate of return to 
education is the relevant return to education for black and white individuals conditional 
on their test scores.  Some of the non-parametric estimates of the rate of return to high 




human capital is more valuable than white human capital, which would also resolve this 
puzzle. 
 
1.2.2 Racial Differences In the Impact of Education on Labor Income Volatility 
If we consider individuals of different races as facing race-specific insurance values of 
education (i.e. ΨED differs by race) equation (1.3) formalizes the intuition noted in the 
introduction.  For members of a race who are supplied with more educational labor 
income insurance, risk aversion will be more positively related to the demand for 
education.  So if education reduces labor income uncertainty more for blacks than for 
whites, relationship between education and risk aversion will be more positive for blacks.   
Thus far I have discussed how racial differences in the insurance value of 
education would affect the demand for education.  This begs the question, why there 
would be racial differences in the relationship between education and labor income 
volatility at all?  As noted in the introduction there are two potential sources for racial 
differences in the effect of education on labor income volatility.  Education may affect 
uncertainty about shocks to a perceived productivity or to a workers actual productivity.    
When there is imperfect information in the labor market about the productivity of 
workers employer learning about the ability of heterogeneous workers will generate labor 
income volatility.  This informational problem would generate racial differences in the 
insurance value of education if employers faced more uncertainty about the ability of 
less-skilled black relative to more-skilled black workers more so than for whites.  If the 
underlying distribution of ability does not differ by race the cutoff ability level in the 




face a larger fixed cost of acquiring education.  The dispersion in abilities will then be 
greatest for blacks with the lowest level of education, so that employers will face the 
greatest uncertainty about the ability of blacks with the lowest level of education.  In a 
model of statistical discrimination with learning as discussed in Altonji and Pierrett 
(2001) this would lead employers to place more weight on observed productivity (and 
less on their prior expected productivity of workers of that group) for less-skilled 
compared to more-skilled black workers in their optimal compensation decisions.10  For 
white workers however, employers would adopt more similar weights for less- and more-
skilled workers.  When the output of all workers is stochastic, the wages of less-skilled 
black workers will be more closely tied to the stochastic component of productivity, 
exposing them to more labor income risk.  Thus, black workers reduce the uncertainty 
that they face about labor income through skill acquisition because their wages are less 
closely tied to the stochastic component of their productivity.  Whites, on the other hand, 
would face compensation schemes that depend less on skill. 
Ethnographic evidence indicates that the uncertainty that employers face about the 
productivity of blacks falls with education.  Kirchenman and Neckerman (1991) 
interviewed 165 employers in Chicago in the late 1980's.  They find the most important 
criteria that employers give for hiring low-skilled blacks is dependability.  In contrast, 
when hiring blacks for clerical jobs (the highest skill category they examine) the most 
important criteria employers give is the ability to deal with the public.  Kirchenman and 
Neckerman go on to describe employer perceptions of the lack of dependability of less-
skilled blacks in the following way: 
                                                 
10 This is a somewhat different implication than we would typically obtain in a more standard statistical 
discrimination model without learning (see Aigner and Cain (1977), Coate and Loury (1993), Autor and 




"What is crucial in these jobs is dependability:  "Every day coming to work on 
time."  Common complaints about low skilled workers focused on those who 
were hired and never showed up, or quit without warning.  Respondents tended to 
use such terms as "stability", "dependability", "good work history" and 
"attendance record" interchangeably, …" 
Kirshenman and Neckerman (1991), pp. 225.   
Lang and Manove (2005) find that education is more valuable signal of ability for blacks 
than for whites.  They show that in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data that 
blacks with intermediate ability in terms of AFQT obtain more education than either 
whites with the same ability, or than blacks with higher or lower ability levels.  These 
results are consistent with the idea that employers are more uncertain about the 
productivity of less skilled blacks. 
The other class of mechanism to consider that generate racial differences in the 
education-labor income volatility gradient involve uncertainty about true productivity 
shocks.  Less-skilled blacks could be more uncertain about employment if for example 
the demand for their labor is concentrated in industries that face more uncertainty about 
product demand or they are subject to more uncertainty about disability or incarceration 
shocks.  There is some evidence in support of this view.  Altonji and Blank (1999) show 
that black employment is concentrated in industries that have volatile employment such 
as manufacturing.  In addition Bound and Freedman (1992) show that racial differences 
in the regional and industrial concentrations of employment was one of the key features 
to lead to the decline of in the employment of less-skilled blacks in the 1980s.  Shocks to 




and racial groups.  Bound, Schoenbaum and Waldman (1995) find that both blacks and 
the less educated are the most likely to be disabled.  This suggests that uncertainty about 
disability shocks falls with skill level more for blacks than whites.  The evidence in 
Lochner and Moretti (2004) indicates the education-probability of incarceration gradient 
is not larger for blacks.  This suggests that incarceration would not lead to any racial 
differences in the insurance value of education.  Thus, there is some evidence that there 
could be important racial differences in the relationship between education and 
uncertainty about employment and disability shocks. 
 
1.3 Data 
This study is conducted using sixteen years (from 1977 to 1992) of data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).11  The sample I use initially contains annual 
observations on a panel of five thousand individuals.  A large number of black 
individuals are in this data set because it has a poverty oversample (the Survey of 
Economic Opportunity (SEO) sub-sample).  This sub-sample has two thousand 
observations and a large fraction of black respondents.  I use the PSID individual 
sampling weights for all estimates to make the estimates representative of the U.S. 
population.12  The variables I take from the PSID are race, education, annual labor 
income, annual social insurance income (unemployment insurance and workers' 
compensation for the household head only, and total dollars of food stamp receipt, SSI 
                                                 
11 I use these years of data because of the major change in the data cleaning procedures that the PSID 
implemented in the 1994 survey year.  Note that I index my sample years not by the survey year, but by the 
year which the labor income report corresponds to, which is one year prior to the survey year. 
12 The individual sampling weights for each year of data are used to generate the labor income volatility 
estimates.  The cross-sectional analysis looking at the relationship between labor income volatility and 
education, as well as, preferences for risk and education uses only the individual sample weights in the 




income, and AFDC income for the household), annual hours worked, number of weeks 
unemployed, household head's marital status, the number of household members, parents 
education wealth, preferences for risk, and the region of the country the household is 
located in.   
I include social insurance income in my measures of total labor income for two 
reasons.  I wish to consider labor market decisions in the context of the social insurance 
mechanisms that are currently in place.  Dyanarski and Gruber (1997) find these 
mechanisms to be a significant source of insurance for labor income volatility.  In 
addition, I am able to include observations with some social insurance income but zero 
labor income in my sample because the log of labor plus social insurance income variable 
is defined for these observations.  The low labor force participation of less-skilled blacks 
may well reflect an important component of labor income uncertainty.  Note that when I 
discuss labor income from this point forward I will be referring to labor plus social 
insurance income.  I also use a measure of disposable labor income by subtracting federal 
income tax liabilities.  I use TAXSIM to simulate the federal tax liability for each 
household head in each year using total annual labor income as wage income and 
declaring all households to be single filers.13  I measure education using categorical 
variables that divide individuals into one of four groups: high school drop out, high 
school graduate, some college attendance and college graduate.  I use these categories 
because in some years of the data years of education is only available as a bracketed 
variable.  
In addition, survey-based measures of risk preferences were collected for 
individuals in the PSID in 1996.  Because of the panel structure of the dataset, I can link 
                                                 




these measures to the sample from earlier years.  These types of measures were first used 
in the Health and Retirement Study and first analyzed in Barsky et al. (1997).  Similar 
measures have been found to be correlated with wealth accumulation (see Charles and 
Hurst (2003)) and savings (see Mazzocco (2004)).   To construct these measures a total of 
five questions concerning lotteries of labor income were asked of employed 
respondents.14  Depending on which gambles were accepted and which were rejected the 
respondent was assigned a coefficient of relative risk aversion.  The PSID creates two 
risk aversion measures based on the responses to these questions. The second of these 
two adjusts the responses using the procedure in Barsky et al. (1997) to minimize 
measurement error due to incomplete responses and this is the risk aversion measure I use 
throughout.   
Unfortunately, there is an important concern with the timing of the PSID risk 
preference measure which makes testing for precautionary demand for education 
problematic.  Risk preference is measured after individuals have made their education 
decisions and experienced labor income volatility.  If risk-aversion is a time-invariant 
individual characteristic then we can consider this measure of risk aversion as indicating 
the individual's preferences for risk at the time educational decisions are made.  However, 
recent work by Brunnemeier (2004) indicates that individuals will have a decreasing 
sensitivity to losses as they experience more losses.  This would imply that as individuals 
experience more negative labor income shocks they become less risk averse.  If education 
reduces the probability of negative labor income shocks, and this reduction leads 
individuals to become less risk averse then we would observe that risk aversion and 
education are negatively correlated.  This negative correlation would solely by due 
                                                 




changes in risk preferences over the sample period, but would be observationally 
equivalent to precautionary demand for education.  There is little direct evidence on the 
diminishing sensitivity to losses and the impact on risk aversion.  Brunnermeier and 
Nagel (2005) examine how individuals reallocate their portfolio in response to wealth 
shocks.  To test for diminishing sensitivity they look at whether an individual reallocates 
their portfolio so that they are subject to more risk after experiencing a wealth shock.  
They find no evidence that this is the case.   
Another issue which I face is that individuals make education based upon their 
unobserved ability which may also be related to labor income volatility.  To address the 
correlation of education with unobserved ability I utilize data on compulsory schooling 
laws as used by Lochner and Moretti (2004).  These laws were originally coded by 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and reflect the maximum of: (1) the minimum number of 
years that the child is required to stay in school, and (2) the difference between the 
earliest and latest age that the child is required to enroll.15 
The sample exclusion rules I impose are the following.16  I only include 
household heads present in the dataset for at least nine years, since many of the required 
variables are only measured for these individuals and to obtain more precise estimates of 
labor income volatility for households I require a reasonable amount of time-series data.  
I drop female household heads because gender differences in labor supply behavior are 
beyond the scope of this chapter.  I drop those who are not between 22 and 45 years of 
                                                 
15 There has been some concern that this coding of laws do not reflect the actual constraints imposed by 
compulsory schooling laws (see the discussion in Goldin and Katz (2003)).  However, the alternative 
compulsory schooling laws utilized in Goldin and Katz do not cover the individuals in my sample period 
(since they are born between the years 1932 and 1955, and are age 14 in 1946 to 1969) so I use the 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) coding here. 




age in 1977, so that the entire sample is of prime working age for the length of the panel.  
Also, I treat top-coded labor income as a missing value.17  It is important to note that I do 
not condition on labor force status in my sample selection because being in a state of non-
employment is likely to represent a significant source of labor income volatility. 
The means of the key variables for this study in the first and last years of the 
sample are displayed in Table 1.A1.  There are two important concerns to note about the 
sample for the analysis that will be conducted.  First, there are a number of observations 
with zero annual labor income and zero annual social insurance income in a given year.  
For these observations the log of annual labor and social insurance income will be 
undefined.  Overall, 2.7 percent of the person-year observations in the sample have a zero 
labor and social insurance income.  For high school dropout blacks, 10.7 percent of the 
person-year observations have a zero value.  Since the PSID data cleaning procedures 
assign a value for labor income for all members of the sample, a zero observation may 
reflect either a year with no labor or social insurance income, or a year where labor and 
social insurance income are not recorded.  In this first case, the zero values will reflect 
true labor income and should be included in the sample when measuring the degree of 
labor income uncertainty individuals have experienced.  In the second case, however, 
including the zeros in the sample treats missing values as significant shocks to labor and 
social insurance income.  In this case, including the zero observations will add noise to 
my measure of labor income volatility which is unrelated to labor income uncertainty 
implying that my labor income volatility estimates will be biased away from zero.  I 
                                                 
17 I lose only 0.11 percent of the person-year observations from this restriction, all of whom are highly 
educated whites.  Those with continuously top coded labor income values would have no measured 




address this concern in the analysis by estimating the models with and without these zero 
observations.  The results are not sensitive to their inclusion. 
The second important concern is that there is differential attrition from the panel 
by race and education.  As can be seen in Table 1.A2, high school dropout blacks are the 
most likely to attrit from the sample.  Since those who attrit from panels are likely those 
with the least stable life circumstances this would imply that I will understate the true 
degree of labor income volatility particularly for black high school dropouts.18  
Systematically understating the true degree labor income volatility faced by less-skilled 
blacks may bias my estimates of the insurance value of education.  The direction of the 
bias depends on whether the education-labor volatility gradient for those who attrit the 
sample is greater or less than those who do not.  I attempt to address this issue by 
controlling for the number of years (minus nine) that an individual appears in the sample.  
The fact that the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the number of years in the 
sample dummy variables as covariates implies that differential attrition is not likely to be 
driving the results. 
 
1.4 Racial Differences In Education and Labor Income Volatility 
In this section I describe the method used to measure labor income volatility and the 
impact of education on labor income volatility.  The idea is that deviations from the 
lifecycle permanent profile represent transitory shocks to labor income.  The measure 
used is the variance of transitory labor income shocks.  This measure of labor income 
volatility is similar to that used in Dynarski and Gruber (1997).  In a world without 
                                                 




financial wealth holding, transitory labor income volatility will accurately reflect the 
welfare loss due to labor income volatility.19   
The analysis follows two steps.  First, for each individual in the sample the 
variance of transitory labor income volatility is estimated using the panel of 16 
observations from 1977 to 1992.  Then I relate these estimated labor income volatilities 
to the education and race of the individual in the 1977 cross-section (the first year of the 
sample).  The central parameter I seek to estimate is the impact of education on exposure 
to labor income volatility for blacks and whites. 
 
1.4.1 Measuring Labor Income Volatility 
Following Dynarski and Gruber (1997) I use a simple procedure to measure transitory 
labor income volatility.  I take the third difference of log labor income20 and regress this 
on a quartic in age and a full set of interactions of the age quartic with race and the three 
                                                 
19 I have conducted an alternative variance decomposition of the type utilized by Carroll and Samwick 
(1997) to look at the impact of education on uncertainty about both permanent and transitory shocks by 
race.  The results of these estimates are that permanent labor income volatility is not related to education 
for either blacks or whites, and that transitory labor income volatility falls more with education for blacks 
than for whites.  Unfortunately, this decomposition procedure does not restrict the permanent and transitory 
estimates to be positive and results in a large number of negative variance estimates.  Over sixty percent of 
the sample has negative permanent or transitory variance estimates.  The large number of negative variance 
estimates seems to indicate that the variance decomposition specification is rejected by the data (perhaps 
due to the affect of measurement error in labor income being correlated with the number of observations 
used for the differences or a correlation between permanent and transitory shocks).  For this reason I do not 
report these results as the central estimates even though they are qualitatively the same as the results that I 
do report. 
20 This method does explicitly allow for autocorrelation in the transitory shocks to current labor income.  A 
number of researchers (McCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989) and, Meghir and Pistaferri (2004)) have 
found this autocorrelation to follow a second order moving average process in the PSID.  Thus, I allow 
transitory labor income shocks to follow an MA(2) process, which means that I estimate the model for the 
third difference in labor income.  I have also estimated all of the models below using the first difference, as 
in Dynarski and Gruber (1997), and the fifth difference, as in Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994).  The results 




educational categories greater than high school dropout, as well as year fixed effects.21   
This allows lifecycle variation in permanent income to differ by race and education, and 
allows for year-specific shocks to permanent income.  I take the square of the residuals 
from the estimation of this equation and divide by two to get an individual specific 
estimate of the amount of transitory labor income volatility.  The exact details of the 
estimation procedure are provided in the data appendix. 
 
1.4.2 The Impact of Education on Labor Income Volatility 
With estimates of transitory labor income volatility for each individual in the sample in 
hand I test for racial differences in the education-labor income volatility gradient in the 
following fashion.  I begin by using the 1977 cross-section to define the population 
(using labor income volatility estimated using data from 1977 to 1992). I first look at the 
differences in the mean of estimated labor income volatility by race and by education 
within race.  I then regress the estimated labor income volatility on individual 
characteristics separately by race, so that I can control for other determinants of the 
observed labor income volatility which may be correlated with education. 
More formally, I estimate the equation  
iiiiiii uXRAdcollegegraesomecolleghsgrad +Λ++++= 4321
2 ββββσ , (1.5) 
by race in the 1977 cross-section.  The estimate of β1 is the conditional effect of being a 
high school graduate relative to a high school dropout on transitory labor income 
                                                 
21 This is similar to the specification used in Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) with race and education 
interactions added.  I find that there is no differential income growth relationship with age by race but that 
the lifecycle profile of earnings does differ by education group.  I have also estimated the models with only 




volatility.  The parameters β1, β2, and β3 are the central estimates of interest.   A negative 
estimate for any of these coefficients implies that higher levels of education reduce labor 
income volatility.  The coefficient β4 is the estimate of the impact of risk aversion 
category on the labor income volatility.  It is expected that β4 will be negative, i.e. that 
those who are most risk averse will experience the least labor income volatility.   
In my first specification the matrix Xi contains covariates such as age, age 
squared, a missing risk preference dummy variable and seven dummies indicating 
whether the individual spends more than nine years in the sample.22  As noted in the 
model above risk averse individuals may self-select into education if it reduces labor 
income volatility.  Risk aversion may also have an independent effect on the volatility of 
labor income because risk averse individuals are able to make other labor market 
decisions which can reduce labor income volatility.  By including risk aversion as a 
covariate I am able to examine the relationship between education and labor income 
volatility treating the risk preference composition of the education group as fixed.  Risk 
aversion and education are not perfectly correlated as long as there are other determinants 
of education which vary across individuals within race, such as discount rates.  In my 
second specification the matrix Xi also contains two dummies for martial status, the size 
of the household and region.  The advantage of adding these covariates is that I am able 
to control for a number of characteristics of individuals which are likely related to both 
education and labor income volatility in different ways by race.  For example, because 
less-skilled black males typically marry black females with more stable labor income 
processes marriage may represent an important source of diversification.  However, these 
                                                 




additional covariates may also be endogenous with respect to education, making the 
resulting parameter estimates of β1, β2, and β3 biased. 
A major issue to confront in the estimation of the transitory variance of labor 
income is measurement error in labor income.  If there is a significant measurement error 
in the first difference of labor income this will increase the estimated standard errors in 
equation (1.5).  Measurement error in labor income could make it difficult to find a 
significant impact of education on risk even if such an impact exists.  In the case of the 
PSID we have a good idea of how much measurement error there is and what form it 
takes.  Bound et al. (1994) examine the PSID validation study data which matches survey 
reports to employer reports of annual earnings and hours for two waves data in the PSID.  
They are able to examine how changes in annual earnings, and hourly earnings, differ 
between employer and self-reported measures.  Approximately twenty-five percent of the 
cross-sectional variance in the first difference of annual labor earnings is due to 
measurement error.  Because the measure that I employ to measure the volatility is the 
third difference in earnings I see this as a reasonable approximation for how much 
measurement error exists in my measure.  Then is some concern that my standard errors 
will be inflated by the additional noise in labor income.  In addition, Bound et al. (1994) 
also find that hourly earnings, as measured by annual labor income divided by annual 
hours worked, is measured more poorly then annual income.  Because I utilize annual 
labor income per hour to measure an individual's annual average wage, wage uncertainty 





A larger concern with measurement error in this context is that it is non-classical 
and correlated with an individuals education or race.  Fortunately the evidence in Bound 
and Krueger (1991) indicates that measurement error in annual labor income appears to 
be uncorrelated with race and education.  They examine a cross-sectional sample from 
Current Population Survey which is matched to employer–reported social security 
earnings data.  While they do find a significant amount of measurement error in terms of 
the mismatch between the annual earnings reported in the survey and by the employer, it 
appears to be uncorrelated with individual observable characteristics.  If this were not 
true we would have to be concerned that the non-classical measurement error in labor 
income would bias the estimates of β1, β2, and β3 differently by race.   
The correlation between unmeasured ability and schooling may also create bias in 
my estimates of β1, β2, and β3 .  The direction of the OLS bias could plausibly go in either 
direction.23  It could be true that those with higher levels of ability would be less subject 
to labor income volatility as they are less likely to have their employment relationships 
end.  Conversely, it could be true that those with higher ability self-select into jobs with 
high-powered incentives, and so their wages are more exposed to productivity risk than 
the wages of those with lower ability.  To address this issue I follow Lochner and Moretti 
(2004) and use compulsory schooling laws at age 14 in an individual’s state of birth as 
excluded instruments for high school graduation to estimate (1.5) (with education defined 
as a binary categorical variable of high school graduation or more) by instrumental 
variables (IV).   
                                                 





This IV specification will identify the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of 
high school graduation on labor income volatility.  In a world where the effects of 
education on labor income volatility are heterogeneous, the LATE estimate is an average 
of the effect of high school graduation on labor income volatility among those who are 
induced to change high school graduation status because of the instrument.  If those who 
change their educational attainment in response to this instrument are representative of 
the overall population in terms of the education-labor income volatility gradient then this 
LATE parameter will be close to the population average treatment effect (ATE).  If this is 
not true, then the LATE estimate could be different than the population ATE. 
 
1.5 Results 
In this section I discuss the results of the estimation procedure described above.  This 
procedure yields estimates of the transitory labor income volatility for each individual in 
the sample.  Table 1.1 provides a first look at how labor income volatility, estimated 
using data from 1977 to 1992, is related to race and education.  The values presented in 
the table are the means of the estimated labor income volatility for each subgroup in the 
1977 cross-section.  Also presented in the table are standard errors and F-statistics for the 





1.5.1 Basic Results 
At the top of Table 1.1 we see that blacks experience about 70 percent more labor income 
volatility than whites.24  This difference is statistically significantly different from zero at 
the five percent level.  This result that blacks experience more labor income volatility 
than whites is consistent with previous work.  The tabulations reported in Altonji and 
Blank (1999) show that blacks are much more likely to be non-employed than whites and 
the results reported in Farber (1993) and Fairlie and Kletzer (1998) indicate that blacks 
are more likely to be displaced.  This result is somewhat different than that found by 
Datcher-Loury (1986), who finds that blacks experience only slightly more labor income 
volatility.25 
The next two sets of results in Table 1.1 examine whether there are differences in 
the amount of labor income volatility experienced by individuals with different levels of 
education within race.  For whites we can see that average labor income volatility is 
higher for dropouts than the other categories.  The difference across education categories 
                                                 
24 These results do not include those observations with zero labor and social insurance in the sample.  The 
results including these observations are presented in the sensitivity analysis.   
25 Using PSID data on black and white household heads aged 24-35 from 1974 to 1977 Datcher-Loury 
finds only a small difference in the stability of high income levels between blacks and whites.  Her central 
results indicate that 44 percent of blacks with annual labor income above $20,000 in every year from 1974 
to 1976 are above this threshold in 1977.  For whites, her results indicate 55 percent have annual labor 
income above this threshold conditional on being above the threshold in all of the previous years.  Her 
work suggests that blacks experience more labor income volatility than whites but the differences are 
modest.  She does not provide a statistical test for the differences in this parameter by race, so it is difficult 
to say whether her estimates indicate whether or not this difference is statistically different from zero.  
There are numerous differences between her study and the present analysis.  I use more years of data which 
allows me to obtain more precise estimates.  In addition, I am using a different sample which includes low 
income blacks.  By examining only high income blacks she is likely to understate the true degree of labor 
income volatility that blacks face if black individuals often experience large shocks which lead them to not 
be in her high-income sample.  If the fixed component of labor income is negatively correlated with the 
variance she will obtain estimates of labor income volatility which are biased downward for blacks. Most 
importantly her chosen measure reflects only one particular component of the volatility in labor income, 




is not statistically different from zero at the five percent level however.  For blacks, 
however, education is associated with a statistically significant decrease in labor income 
volatility.  These results indicate that blacks are receiving a larger amount of income 
insurance from education than whites.  However, as noted above these correlations may 
not be causal if high school dropout blacks are less risk averse than more educated blacks 
and risk aversion has an effect on labor income volatility.  If more risk averse blacks 
chose to acquire more education, and risk aversion is negatively correlated with labor 
income volatility these results could be attributable to the composition of the education 
groups in terms of their risk preferences.  The results in Table 1.1 could be explained 
because less-skilled blacks are less risk averse than more-skilled blacks, without 
education actually having a causal impact on labor income volatility at all. 
Table 1.2 presents the estimates from the OLS estimation of equation (5).  This 
equation is estimated separately by race for the 1977 cross-section.  Each column in the 
table presents the estimates from one specification.  Model (1) includes only age, age 
squared and seven dummies for spending more than 9 years in the sample as additional 
covariates.26  Model (2) adds three dummies for martial status, the number of household 
members and dummies for census regions.  The omitted educational category is high 
school dropout.  Because these specifications control for the risk preferences they address 
the concern that the basic correlations are not causal due to selection into education based 
on preferences for risk. 
The point estimates in the first two columns of Table 1.2 indicate that while high 
school graduation, some college, and college graduation are negatively associated with 
                                                 
26 These dummies are intended to address the fact that the less-skilled, and less-skilled blacks especially, 




labor income volatility for whites, the coefficient estimates are not significantly different 
from zero at the 5 percent level.  This result is consistent with the findings of Carroll and 
Samwick (1997) who find that education is not related to transitory labor income 
volatility in a statistically significant way looking at a population of white males in the 
PSID. 
Another interesting result in the first two columns of Table 1.2 is that the point 
estimate of the impact of risk aversion is negative and statistically different from zero at 
the 5 percent level.  This suggests that individuals are making decisions about which jobs 
to select based on their preferences for risk and expectations about which jobs are likely 
to be risky.  We would expect that the most risk averse will choose jobs with less volatile 
labor income paths.  This result validates the key concern underlying the precautionary 
savings test implemented by Fuchs-Schundeln and Schundeln (2005) that those who are 
more risk averse will choose less volatile income paths. 
The central result in this chapter emerges in columns three and four of Table 1.2.  
The estimates show that high school and college graduation both reduce labor income 
volatility for blacks.  The negative point estimates are significantly different from zero at 
the five percent level.  The large magnitude of these estimates relative to whites is 
especially notable.  They indicate that by becoming college graduates blacks reduce their 
exposure to labor income volatility by more than 90 percent (column 3) or more than 65 
percent (column 4) relative to high school dropout blacks.  These are large reductions in 
labor income volatility.  The specifications in column four also control for marital status, 
household size and region.  It is important to note that the coefficient estimates of the 




The central results in the above tables are difficult to reconcile with those of 
Palacios-Huerta (2003).  He finds that education is a more valuable asset for whites than 
for blacks.  Using time-series wage data from the CPS for full-time employed individuals 
he applies the method of mean-variance spanning to value education assets.  For racial 
differences, the method is based on taking the mean and variance of the return to 
education for an individual of a given race and asking whether adding the education of an 
individual of the other race would improve the mean return per unit risk of the original 
portfolio.  He finds that a white individual would not want to add black education to their 
portfolio, and a black individual would want to add white education.  This implies that 
black education is less valuable than white education. 
There are a number of concerns with the method employed in Palacios-Huerta 
(2003).  First, because he looks at time-series variation in the rate of return to education 
within experience-education-race cells, he is not measuring most of the uncertainty about 
labor income that individuals actually face.  Individual-level uncertainty will be averaged 
away by his procedure.  Second, on a conceptual level it is not possible for black 
individuals to ever hold white education.  General education can only be owned by the 
individual who invested in it.  Thus, while this framework is conceptually correct for 
decisions about the holding of various financial assets it breaks down when considering 
the holding of different individual's education.  The mean-variance spanning procedure 
he uses is inconsistent with the fact the general human capital in non-tradable.  Lastly, he 
only includes full-time employed individuals in his sample. Thus, he is measuring mostly 
wage risk, disregarding a potentially important source of labor income volatility: 





1.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis:  Instrumental Variables Estimates 
A concern with the results presented thus far is that the estimates showing the insurance 
value of education for blacks could be biased due to omitted ability.  The direction of the 
bias could go in either direction.  Individuals with higher levels of unobserved ability 
may be less likely to have their employment relationships end and experience less labor 
income risk.  This would imply that the OLS estimates are upward biased.  Conversely 
those with higher ability may select into jobs with high-powered incentives and be 
exposed to more labor income volatility.  In this case the OLS estimates will be biased 
downward. 
I address this concern by comparing OLS and IV estimates of the impact of high 
school graduation or more on labor income volatility in Table 1.3.27  Panel A in Table 1.3 
displays OLS estimates of the relationship between high school graduation or more (this 
variable subsumes all of the educational categories used in the previous analysis) and 
labor income volatility by race.28  The results are qualitatively the same as in Table 1.2; 
blacks receive a statistically significant insurance benefit from education, whereas whites 
do not.  In panel B of Table 1.3, I present IV estimates where high school graduation or 
more is instrumented with compulsory schooling laws as of age of 14 in the individual's 
state of birth.   
                                                 
27 Note that the sample size in the Panel B of Table 3 is slightly smaller than in Panel A.  This is due to the 
fact that a small number of individuals in the sample are foreign born or have missing values for state of 
birth.  It is not possible match these individuals to the appropriate compulsory schooling law so they must 
dropped from the sample for the Instrumental Variables specification. 
28 The reason to pool the education categories here is that compulsory school laws have the largest effect in 
terms of moving individuals out of the high school dropout education level into the high school graduate 




The results in columns one and two show that although the point estimates of the 
impact of education on labor income volatility are positive for whites, they are not 
statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level.   In columns three and four we see 
that the coefficient estimates are negative and statistically different from zero for blacks.  
These point estimates are very large, but they are not statistically different from the 
estimates presented in panel A.  This suggests that correlation between education and 
ability does not lead to substantial bias in the OLS estimates in this context. 
It is important to be precise in the interpretation of the parameter estimated in the 
IV specifications in panel B of Table 1.3.  The IV estimates are LATE parameters, they 
measure the relationship between education and labor income volatility for those who are 
induced to change education status by the compulsory schooling law.  When different 
individuals have different education-labor income volatility gradients some of the 
differences in between the OLS and IV estimates reflect the fact that they are based on 
different populations.  The fact the IV point estimates for blacks are larger than the 
corresponding OLS estimates could be because the blacks for whom the compulsory 
schooling law binds have particularly large education-labor income volatility gradients. 
That the F-statistics for joint test that the excluded instruments in the first-stage 
are zero indicate that there is a weak instrument concern here for whites.  In the first 
specification the excluded instruments are jointly significantly different from zero in the 
first stage at the 5 percent level with an F-statistic of 3.07.  When the additional controls 
are added the F-statistic drops to a value of 1.31 and indicates that the excluded 
instruments are statistically different from zero.  This weak instrument problem is likely 




the compulsory schooling laws may not be especially binding for whites.  The IV 
estimates for whites are arguably inferior to the OLS estimates for this reason.  The 
results in this table imply that the OLS estimates are preferred, so I now only present 
OLS estimates in what follows. 
 
1.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Measures of Labor Income 
Another concern with measuring labor income volatility is whether zero values for labor 
and social insurance income are due to measurement error or really measure true 
uncertainty.  In the analysis thus far we have excluded these observations with zero 
income from the measure of transitory labor income volatility reported in Tables 1.1, 1.2 
and 1.3.  Because labor force participation rates are very low for less-skilled blacks, and 
labor force non-participation may represent a significant source of uncertainty, it is 
important to check the sensitivity of the results to excluding zero labor income 
observations.   
In Table 1.4, I include observations with zero labor income by recoding zero labor 
and social insurance income to be equal to one, so that log of income is now defined for 
these observations.  The estimates in columns one and two indicate there is no 
statistically significant relationship between education and labor income volatility for 
whites.  In columns three and four, however, we see that the coefficient on college 
graduation is negative and statistically significantly for blacks.29 
                                                 
29 I have also estimated a probit model of whether income is zero or not with the same covariates as in 
specification (1) in Table 2 by race.  I find that for individuals of either race both high school graduation 
and college graduation reduce the probability of a zero labor and social insurance income observation 




Dynarski and Gruber (1997) show that one of the most important mechanisms for 
smoothing variable labor income is the progressive nature of the income tax schedule.  
This is true because the volatility in disposable income is less closely tied to volatility in 
earned labor income at higher marginal tax rates.  Because the marginal tax rate falls as 
earned labor income falls, a negative shock to earned labor income may result in a fall in 
the marginal tax rate which provides some additional insurance for disposable income.  In 
Table 1.5, I examine whether accounting for progressive income taxation significantly 
affects my results.  I use TAXSIM to estimate the federal tax liability for each individual 
in my sample for each year based on their total labor income.  I subtract this tax liability 
from the total of labor and social insurance income to construct the disposable income-
based measure of risk reported in Table 1.5.30  In contrast to the results above the 
estimates do indicate that white individuals receive a statistically significant reduction in 
labor income volatility from high school graduation, though only in the specification with 
limited covariates.  For blacks we observe that college graduates receive a statistically 
significant decrease in labor income volatility in both specifications, and blacks with a 
high school diploma or some college are exposed to less volatility in the last 
specification.  These results indicate that racial differences of the impact of high school 
graduation are somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of taxes in the measurement of labor 
income volatility.  However it is important to note two points about the results in Table 
1.5.  First, college graduate blacks still receive a larger reduction in exposure to labor 
income volatility than college graduate whites. Second, all of the point estimates for the 
                                                                                                                                                 
more than four times larger for blacks than for whites indicating that role of education in reducing the 
probability of a zero labor plus social insurance income observation is larger for blacks. 
30 This measure does not contain recoded observations for zero total labor income as in Table 4.  It is the 




impact of education on labor income volatility in Table 1.5 are more negative for blacks 
than for whites. 
In Table 1.6 I examine whether the results are sensitive to the exclusion of social 
insurance income from the labor income measure.  Redefining labor income in this way 
redefines the zero labor income observations.  The sample is now smaller as those 
individuals who with zero labor income but some social insurance income are excluded 
from the sample.  The results in Table 1.6 indicate that, for whites, acquiring any 
education level beyond dropping out of high school results in a statistically significant 
decrease in the amount of labor income volatility experienced.  For blacks however, only 
college graduates experience a large statistically significant reduction in labor income 
volatility.  The impact of college graduation on exposure to labor income volatility for 
blacks is statistically different and larger than the corresponding estimate for whites when 
we compare the results in columns one and three.  The estimates in column two and four 
for the relationship between college graduation and labor income volatility are not 
statistically different, but the point estimate is larger for blacks. 
  
1.5.4 Education and Sources of Labor Income Risk 
I now look more closely at the determinants of labor income volatility and how education 
impacts two sources of labor income uncertainty: wage volatility, and volatility in weeks 
unemployed.  For both sources of volatility I implement the same methodology as I 
conducted above for labor income volatility.31  I measure transitory wage volatility using 
                                                 
31 The procedure I follow is to first regress the third difference of wages or weeks unemployed on the age 
and, age*education.  I then take the residuals from this regression, square them and divide by two to obtain 





the full panel from 1977 to 1992, and then examine how wage volatility differs by 
education for blacks and whites in the 1977 cross-section.  Wages are measured as the 
ratio of annual labor income (excluding all social insurance income) to total annual hours 
worked.   I also use the same procedure of taking out lifecycle variation and examining 
the variance of the third difference of weeks unemployed.32  This measure of employment 
uncertainty is used because there is likely be less measurement error than for hours 
worked.   
As noted above, studying the impact of education on wage and employment 
volatility is a worthwhile exercise to better understand the mechanisms underlying the 
relationship between education and labor income risk.  If the racial differences in the 
impact of education on labor income volatility are mostly driven by employment shock 
uncertainty then we would expect that volatility of weeks worked should fall more with 
education for blacks than for whites.  Conversely if racial differences in the impact of 
education on labor income volatility stem mostly from employers being very uncertain of 
the productivity of black high school dropouts then we should see that the volatility of 
wages should fall more with education for blacks.   
The results in Table 1.7 show that there are differences by race in volatility of 
wages and weeks unemployed.  Blacks face significantly more uncertainty about weeks 
unemployed than whites.  These differences by race are significant at the five percent 
level.  While the point estimates indicate that blacks are exposed to more wage volatility 
than whites, these differences are not statistically significant.  Thus, the results in Table 
1.1 that blacks face more labor income risk seem to be driven largely by racial 
                                                 
32 This measure includes the total number of weeks that the respondent reports being unemployed or 




differences in employment volatility.  Interestingly, when we look at the relationship 
between education and the volatility of wages by race we see that only blacks have 
statistically significant differences across educational categories.  The point estimates 
also indicate that the magnitude of the reduction in the volatility of wages is larger for 
blacks than for whites.  White college graduates experience a statistically insignificant 20 
percent reduction of the wage volatility relative to white high school dropouts.   In 
contrast, black college graduates experience a more than 75 percent reduction the wage 
volatility compared to black high school dropouts.  In addition, the results in Table 1.7 
show that both black and white individuals receive large and statistically significant 
reductions in the volatility of weeks unemployed from education, with blacks again 
experiencing the larger reduction. 
In Table 1.8, I display OLS estimates for the effect of education on wage 
volatility.  These are the same specifications as reported above in Table 1.2, but now with 
wage risk as the dependent variable. There are two interesting results to note in column 
three.  First, college graduate blacks experience a statistically significant reduction in 
wage volatility compared to black high school dropouts.  However, whites receive no 
statistically significant reduction in wage volatility from education.  This suggests that 
some of the racial difference in the impact of education on labor income volatility is due 
to a reduction in wage volatility.  In column four, we see that conditioning on the 
demographic controls the relationship between education and wage volatility for blacks is 
no longer statistically significant.  That the point estimates on college graduation are very 
similar across columns three and four indicates that this result could be due to 




Table 1.9 displays the results of OLS regressions of education on employment 
volatility.  In the first two columns the results clearly show that education beyond the 
high school dropout level leads to a large statistically significant reduction in 
employment volatility for whites.  The estimates in column one and two are very similar, 
indicating that adding the additional demographic controls does little to alter this 
relationship.  Turning now to columns three and four the estimates indicate that blacks 
also receive a large and statistically significant reduction in employment volatility.  The 
estimated impact of education on employment volatility for blacks is larger than that for 
whites.  This suggests that racial differences of the impact of education on employment 
volatility can also provide some explanation for the racial differences in the impact of 
education on labor income volatility found above.33 
 
1.6  Preferences For Risk and Educational Attainment 
The results thus far indicate that blacks receive more labor income insurance from 
education than whites.  In this next section I study whether these racial differences in the 
insurance value of education lead to racial differences in the impact of risk aversion on 
the demand for education as the theoretical model in section 2 would predict.  If the 
estimates above are unbiased and uncertainty about labor income influences behavior 
then we should observe that more risk averse blacks acquire more education while risk 
averse whites do not.  This is conditional of course, on black and white individuals being 
                                                 
33 I have also examined the impact of education on the variance of current labor force status by race 
(without taking out lifecycle variation).  The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 9.  
Blacks and whites reduce their uncertainty about being either unemployed or non-employed by acquiring 
education.  Moreover, the reduction in labor force status uncertainty due to education is larger for blacks 




aware of the insurance value of education that they face.  This serves as an indirect test of 
the hypothesis that markets for labor income volatility sharing are incomplete in an 
important way.  If individuals can perfectly smooth consumption in response to labor 
income shocks then the measure of labor income volatility should not affect decision 
regarding educational attainment.   
The model I estimate can be expressed as 
iiii XRAEducation ηδ +Γ+= 1 ,      (1.6) 
where RAi is the survey-based risk aversion measure, Xi is a matrix of additional 
covariates and ηi is the error term.  I estimate this equation using two different measures 
of education.  I first use a dummy for high school graduate or more as a binary education 
measure and estimate a probit model.   I then use a categorical measure for education and 
estimate an ordered probit model.   
The coefficient of interest is δ1 which measures the relationship between risk 
aversion and educational attainment.  If δ1 is positive it indicates that more risk averse 
individuals obtain more education.  The central question is whether the estimate of δ1 is 
different for blacks and whites.  Because the results above show that blacks receive more 
labor income insurance from education than whites we would expect δ1 to be larger for 
blacks than whites, as long as precautionary motives affect the demand for education. 
I estimate several specifications of (1.6) which include different sets of covariates 
in Xi.  In model (1) I include only age, age squared and region dummy controls.  In the 
second model I add covariates for parent’s education levels.  In the third and fourth 
models I add linear and categorical covariates for own wealth (with a dummy variable for 




wealth is imperfect in this context because it will be endogenously affected by the 
amount of labor income volatility an individual has experienced.  However, because 
individuals are able to self-insure against labor income volatility by accumulating 
financial wealth it is important to see if any relation between education and preferences 
for risk holds up when we condition on wealth.  A preferable variable would be an 
arguably exogenous measure of wealth such as parental wealth.  Unfortunately, parental 
wealth (as collected in 1988) is missing for most of the sample due to non-response and 
attrition so the individual's wealth in 1994 is the best available substitute.  I estimate this 
model on the 1992 cross-section, which is closest in time to the 1996 survey date within 
my sample.  This allows me to minimize the number of missing values for risk 
preferences, though there are still a significant number.34  The tabulation of the risk 
aversion measure by race and education is reported in Table 1.A3. 
Table 1.10 presents estimates of the derivatives evaluated at the mean of the 
independent variables and their associated standard errors for the probit models where the 
independent variable is high school graduate or more.  The first column indicates that risk 
aversion is negatively and statistically significantly associated with high school 
graduation for whites.  The fifth column shows that risk aversion for blacks is positively 
and statistically significantly associated with high school graduation.  The results for 
blacks are consistent with high school graduation providing a reduction in exposure to 
labor income volatility, as we found above.  In contrast, the results for whites are not 
consistent with the previous results, since we did not find that exposure to labor income 
volatility increased with high school graduation for whites.  
                                                 





When the controls for parents' education (columns two and six in Table 1.10) are 
added, the estimates of the derivative evaluated at the mean of risk aversion on high 
school graduation for whites drop in magnitude by nearly a factor of two and become 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.  For blacks the estimated derivative of risk 
aversion on high school graduation remains positive and statistically significantly 
different from zero.  These are important specifications for two reasons.  First, Charles 
and Hurst (2003) have shown that there is significant intergenerational correlation in risk 
preferences.  If there is a long-run relationship between risk preferences and education, 
omitting parents' education is a significant problem as it is potentially correlated both 
with the child's educational attainment and risk preferences.  Second, it is important to 
note that the results are robust to including both linear and categorical wealth controls 
(columns three and four, and seven and eight).  We would expect that those who are more 
risk averse would hold more wealth to self-insure against labor income volatility which 
would allow individuals to insure consumption through wealth alone.  The results here 
show that risk aversion is positively associated with high school graduation for blacks, 
but not robustly associated with high school graduation for whites. 
The binary education category probit model estimates above do not use all of the 
available information on education.  The ordered probit results in Table 1.8 do use all of 
this information.  The education category dependent variable here takes on one of four 
values: one for high school dropout, two for high school graduate only, three for some 
college and four for college graduate.  Because the dependent variable is a categorical 
variable (i.e. the mean does not have a sensible interpretation) I do not present marginal 




coefficient estimates and standard errors, which are useful for statistical inference about 
the sign of the relationship but do not have any clear interpretation in terms of 
magnitudes. 
The results from the ordered probit model estimation reported in Table 1.11 for 
blacks confirm the main findings of Table 1.10.  More risk averse blacks acquire more 
education.  This result is robust to the inclusion of parents’ education and wealth controls.  
The results for whites in Table 1.11 are more puzzling.  They indicate that whites who are 
more risk averse acquire less education, and this coefficient is statistically significantly 
different from zero.  This would be consistent with the model if education increased labor 
income volatility for whites.  In general I do not find this to be true.  However, the results 
in Table 1.5, where tax liabilities are subtracted from total labor and social insurance 
income, suggest a possible answer.  In this set of results the relationship between 
education and exposure to labor income volatility is not monotonic for whites.  Whites 
who move from any other level of education into the high school graduate only category 
receive some labor income insurance.  It is possible that risk averse whites who are on the 
margin between some college and high school graduation choose to become high school 
graduates because of the fact that the can reduce their uncertainty about labor income by 
making this choice.  This could explain the results for whites in Table 1.11.  However, 
this somewhat unsatisfying explanation means that results for whites remain puzzling. 
In Table 1.12 I present ordered probit model estimates similar to those in columns 
four and eight in Table 1.11, but with risk aversion interacted with the wealth categorical 
variable.35  In this specification I am interested in testing if the positive relationship 
between education and risk aversion for blacks is strongest amongst those least self-
                                                 




insured against labor income volatility -- those with the lowest wealth holding.  The 
omitted group (and interaction) is those with the most wealth.  The results in the first two 
columns of the table indicate that there is no differential relationship between risk 
aversion and education by wealth for whites.  Interestingly, in columns three and four we 
notice that the positive relationship between risk aversion and education found for blacks 
in Tables 1.10 and 1.11 is strongest for those with moderately low levels of wealth 
holdings.  Because those individuals with less wealth are exposed to more consumption 
volatility for a given amount of labor income volatility this is exactly the result we would 
expect.  The fact that those blacks with the lowest levels of wealth do not have the 
strongest relationship between risk aversion and education may reflect the fact that they 
do not have the previously acquired skills to be near the margin for high school 
completion and other higher levels of educational attainment.  Neal and Johnson (1996) 
and Cameron and Heckman (2001) argue that the lack of skill development early in the 
lifecycle for blacks is one of the main determinants of racial differences in education.  
The results from this table show that blacks who are most exposed to labor income 
volatility have demand for education that is most sensitive to risk-aversion.  This fact 




The central result of this chapter is that blacks receive more labor income insurance from 
the accumulation of education than whites do.  The fact that more risk averse blacks 




value.  Precautionary motives do operate for human wealth, much as previous research 
has shown they do for financial wealth.   
That the results seem to be driven partly by racial differences in the impact of 
education on wage volatility is consistent with a statistical discrimination model where 
employers are less certain initially about the productivity of less-skilled blacks than more 
highly-skilled blacks.  While the evidence on the impact of education on wage volatility 
is indeed suggestive of this mechanism, further work to directly test for this precise 
mechanism would be valuable.  A test of the sort introduced by Altonji and Pierret (2001) 
could be implemented to test whether employers learn more about less-skilled blacks than 
more-skilled blacks over their careers.  This would suggest that employers have less 
initial information about the productivity of less-skilled blacks.  In addition, efforts to 
calibrate more realistic models where individuals can insure consumption both by 
accumulating a buffer stock of assets and acquiring education to attempt to match racial 
differences in human and financial wealth holding would be valuable.   
More broadly, this research implies that the determinants of the cross-sectional 
distribution of human wealth and the cross-sectional distribution of financial wealth 
holdings are not as different as the previous literature would lead us to believe.  
Individual investment decisions about how much wealth to hold in either human or 
financial forms are both related to individuals’ desire to self-insure against labor income r 
uncertainty.  The same prudence motive operates in both contexts, driving precautionary 
















Systematic and rigorous program evaluation represents an important component of 
evidence-based policy.  Recent developments in econometric evaluation methods, 
summarized in, e.g., Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) and Abbring, Heckman and 
Vytlacil (2005), have been rapid and substantively important.  Social experiments, 
virtually unknown before 1970, are now frequently used to evaluate a wide variety of 
economic, social and criminal justice policies; see the exhaustive list in Greenberg and 
Shroder (2004).   
At the same time, participant evaluations have gained attention as a complement 
to, or substitute for, experimental or econometric evaluation of such programs.  
Participant evaluation builds on responses by program participants to survey questions 
about whether or not the program helped them.  While the specific question wording, as 
well as the number and specificity of the questions, varies substantially among programs, 
the data from many, if not most, econometric and experimental evaluations that rely on 
survey data for their outcome measures (rather than, or in addition to, administrative 
data) include participant evaluations. 
This chapter compares econometric estimates of program impacts at the 
individual or subgroup level with individual participant evaluations using the rich data 
from the U.S. National Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) Study (NJS).  JTPA was the 




1980s and 1990s.  Section 2.2 describes the JTPA experimental evaluation and the data it 
generated in detail, including the specific structure and wording of the participant 
evaluation survey question. 
We consider two big picture interpretations of our comparisons between 
econometric impact estimates and participant evaluations.  The first interpretation 
assumes the consistency of both estimators, but views them as estimating different 
parameters.  In this view, the econometric impact estimates consistently measure the 
treatment effect of a program on a specific outcome, such as earnings or employment, 
over a specific time period. The participant evaluation, in contrast, consistently estimates 
the treatment effect of the program on participant utility, with the reference period 
depending on the question wording (and perhaps on participant interpretation conditional 
on the wording).  In this context, the relationship between the two measures provides 
information on the relative importance of impacts on earnings and employment in the 
period covered by the econometric impact estimate to participants’ overall benefit (or 
lack thereof) from program participation. 
The second interpretation presumes that participants, like econometricians, have 
difficulty constructing the counterfactual outcome required to estimate the impact of a 
program.  In this view, because constructing counterfactuals constitutes a cognitively 
difficult task, participants may (implicitly) rely on crude, cognitively inexpensive 
methods of impact estimation in constructing their self-reported impacts.  The cognitively 
inexpensive alternatives to consistent estimation of the counterfactual we consider 




and outcomes (what happened in the labor market without reference to a counterfactual) 
as proxies for impacts.   
The second interpretation of the relationship between econometric impact 
estimates (including proxy measures) and participant evaluations has a number of 
empirical implications.  First, consistent econometric estimates may have only a weak 
relationship with participant evaluations, even if participants care a lot about the outcome 
in question over the period covered by the econometric estimates.  Second, comparisons 
of the strength of the relationship between participant evaluations and estimates produced 
by alternative impact estimators may shed light on the particular estimator implicitly 
employed by program participants in responding to survey questions on program benefits.  
Third, participant evaluations may exhibit a strong relationship with econometric impacts 
constructed using the same crude estimators that the participants implicitly use.   
We also consider the relationship between the impact proxies commonly used in 
administrative performance standards systems for employment and training programs and 
participant self-evaluations.  These measures, which consist of simple but poor proxies 
for long run impacts on earnings and employment, represent a bureaucratic solution to the 
difficulties associated with constructing proper impact estimates quickly and at low cost.  
Their simplicity and low cost suggest that participants may (implicitly) rely on them as 
well in constructing their survey responses.  In addition, this analysis has independent 
interest in that it suggests the extent to which participant evaluations might substitute for 
these measures in administrative performance systems. 
 In addition to informing decisions about how best to evaluate policies, our 




their program impacts, and how they go wrong if they cannot, has implications for the 
interpretation of instrumental variables estimates in the context of the correlated random 
coefficient model, as in Angrist (2004), Heckman (1997a), Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) 
and Carniero, Heckman and Vytlacil (2005).  In that model, complications arise when 
using instruments that are correlated with the individual-specific component of impacts.  
Those problems go away if individuals do not know their impacts (that is, if they make 
decisions based on “noise”).  Of course, if individuals use biased estimates of their 
impacts in making decisions, the problems may return in a different form depending on 
how the bias relates to the instrument.  Second, and more broadly, the ability to 
individuals to accurately envision the outcomes associated with alternative choices lies at 
the heart of rational models of human behavior.  We return to this broader issue in the 
conclusion and offer some thoughts regarding the meaning of our results in terms of this 
broader question. 
 We have identified little in the way of existing literature that tries to link objective 
impact estimates with subjective participant evaluations.  The most directly related 
analyses are those of Heckman and Smith (1998) and Philipson and Hedges (1998), both 
of which use treatment group dropout as a crude indicator of participants’ evaluations.  
More broadly, Jacob and Lefgren (2005) compare principals’ subjective evaluations of 
teachers to econometric estimates of teacher value added, but do not consider the 
teachers’ evaluations of their own value-added.  Prendergast (1999) reviews the literature 
on subjective performance evaluation, but that literature primarily views subjective 
evaluations as a way to deal with situations in which agents have multiple tasks (the 




cost-saving alternative to objective evaluation.  That literature is also focused mainly on 
performance evaluation of workers within firms, not evaluation of the effects of programs 
on participant labor market outcomes. 
 To foreshadow our main findings, the data indicate that the impact estimates we 
prefer – the ones using subgroup variation in experimental impacts and the ones based on 
quantile differences – have little relationship with self-reported impacts.  At the same 
time, inputs, outcomes and simple before-after estimates all do predict self-reported 
impacts, often strongly so. 
 We organize the remainder of the chapter as follows.  Section 2.2 describes the 
data from the JTPA experiment and the basic structure of the JTPA program.  Section 2.3 
presents the conceptual framework that guides our econometric analysis and our 
interpretation of our results.  Section 4 discusses the construction and interpretation of the 
alternative econometric estimates of program impact on employment and earnings that 
we construct using the experimental data.  Section 2.5 presents our results on the 
relationship between participants’ self-reported impacts and impacts estimated using the 
experimental data.  Section 2.6 examines the relationship between self-reported impacts 
and before-after employment and earnings changes, as well as proxies such as inputs and 
outcomes while Section 2.7 examines the relationship between self-reported evaluations 
and performance measures.  Finally, Section 2.8 lays out the conclusions that we draw 
from our analysis. 
 
 
2.2 Data and Institutions 
 





The U.S. Job Training Partnership Act program was the primary federal program 
providing employment and training services to the disadvantaged from 1982, when it 
replaced the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) program, to 1998, 
when it was replaced by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) program.  All of these 
programs share more or less the same set of services (though the latter two omit the 
public sector jobs that led to scandal under CETA) and serve the same basic groups.  
They differ primarily in their organizational details (i.e. do cities or counties play the 
primary role) and in the emphasis on, and ordering of, the various services provided.  
Nonetheless, the commonalities dominate with the implication that our results for JTPA 
likely generalize to WIA (and CETA).36 
 The JTPA eligibility rules included categorical eligibility for individuals receiving 
means tested transfers such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or its 
successor Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) as well as food stamps.  In addition, 
individuals were eligible if their family income in the preceding six months fell below a 
specific cutoff value.  There were also special eligibility rules for a number of small 
groups and a 10 percent “audit” window that basically allowed local sites to enroll 
individuals at their own discretion.  See Devine and Heckman (1996) for more details on 
the JTPA eligibility rules and Kemple, Doolittle and Wallace (1993) for detailed 
descriptive statistics on the experimental sample in the NJS.  Heckman and Smith (1999, 
2004) provide thorough analyses of the determinants of participation in JTPA conditional 
on eligibility. 
                                                 
36 One possible caveat is that potential participants may have better information to guide them in making 
participation decisions about a relatively old program, as JTPA was at the time of the experiment, then 





 The JTPA program provided five major services: classroom training in 
occupational skills (CT-OS), subsidized on-the-job training (OJT), job search assistance 
(JSA), adult basic education (ABE) and subsidized work experience (WE).  Local sites 
had the flexibility to emphasize or de-emphasize particular services in response to the 
needs of the local population and the availability of local service providers.  In general, 
CT-OS was the most expensive service, followed by OJT, ABE and WE.   JSA costs a lot 
less.  See Heinrich, Marschke and Zhang (1998) for a detailed study of costs in JTPA and 
Wood (1995) for information on costs at the NJS study sites.   
 Services get assigned to individuals by caseworkers, typically as the result of a 
decision process that incorporates the participant’s abilities and desires.  This process 
leads to clear patterns in terms of the observable characteristics of participants assigned 
to each service.  The most job ready individuals typically get assigned to JSA or OJT, 
while less job ready individuals typically get assigned to CT-OS, ABE or WE, where CT-
OS often gets followed by JSA.  See Kemple, Doolittle and Wallace (1993) for more 
about the service assignment process.  This strongly non-random assignment process has 
implications for our analyses below in which we examine the relationship between the 
participant evaluations and types of services they receive. 
 
 
2.2.2 The National JTPA Study data 
 
The National JTPA Study (NJS) evaluated the JTPA program using a random assignment 
design.  It was the first major social experiment to evaluate an ongoing program rather 
than a demonstration program brought into existence solely for the purposes of the 




the more than 600 JTPA Service Delivery Areas (SDAs).  Each SDA had a local 
geographic monopoly on the provision of employment and training services funded under 
the JTPA.  The exact period of random assignment varied among the sites, but in most 
cases random assignment ran from late 1987 or early 1988 until sometime in spring or 
summer of 1989.  A total of 20,601 individuals were random assigned, usually but not 
always with the probability of assignment to the treatment group set at 0.67.   
 The NJS data come from multiple sources.  First, respondents completed a 
Background Information Form (BIF) at the time of random assignment.  The BIF 
collected basic demographic information along with information on past schooling and 
training and on labor market outcomes at the time of random assignment and earlier.  
Second, all experimental sample members were asked to complete the first follow-up 
survey around 18 months after random assignment.  This survey collected information on 
employment and training services (and any formal schooling) received in the period since 
random assignment, as well as monthly information on employment, hours and wages, 
from which a monthly earnings measure was constructed.  Third, a random subset (for 
budgetary reasons) of the experimental sample members was asked to complete a second 
follow-up survey around 32 months after random assignment.  This survey collected 
similar information for the period since the completion of the first follow-up survey or, in 
the case of individuals who did not complete the first follow-up survey, over the period 
since random assignment.  Response rates to both follow-up surveys were around 80 




UI records in the states corresponding to the 16 NJS states were collected.37 See Doolittle 
and Traeger (1990) on the design of the NJS, Orr et al. (1996) and Bloom et al. (1997) for 
the official impact reports and Heckman and Smith (2000) and Heckman, Hohmann, 
Smith and Khoo (2000) for further interpretation.  Appendix 1 describes the data used in 
this study in greater detail. 
 
2.2.3 The self-evaluation questions 
 
Exhibit 2.1 presents the two survey questions that, taken together, define the participant 
evaluation measure we use in this chapter.  The question appears on both the first follow-
up survey and the second follow-up survey.  In both cases, the skip pattern in the survey 
excluded control group members from both questions.  Respondents in the treatment 
group were asked these questions in the second follow-up survey only if they did not 
complete the first follow-up survey. 
 The first question asks treatment group members whether or not they participated 
in JTPA.  The question assumes application because it is implied by the respondent 
having been randomly assigned.  The JTPA program had different names in the various 
sites participating in the evaluation; the interviewer included the appropriate local name 
in each site as indicated in the question.   
 In the second question, respondents who self-report having participated in the 
program get asked whether the program helped them get a job or perform better on the 
job.  This is not the ideal question from our point of view, as it focuses more on a specific 
                                                 
37 These data were collected twice, once for 12 of the 16 sites by Abt Associates, one of the prime 
contractors on the original experiment, and then for all 16 sites later on by Westat under a separate contract.  




outcome than on an overall impact, but it is what we have to work with in the JTPA 
evaluation.  However, to the extent that it focuses respondents’ attention specifically on 
the effect of program participation on labor market outcomes, it should increase the 
strength of the relationship between the participant evaluations and the econometric 
estimates of labor market impacts, relative to a broader question that asked about generic 
program benefits. 
 We code the responses to both questions as dummy variables.  The participant 
evaluation measure employed in our empirical work consists of the product of the two 
dummy variables.  Put differently, our self-reported evaluation measure equals one if the 
respondent replies “YES” to question (D7), and “YES” to question (D9).  Otherwise, it 
equals zero. 
 
2.3 Conceptual framework 
2.3.1 A simple model of participants’ self-reported evaluations 
In this section, we lay out a model of how individual participants might respond to a 
question regarding whether or not they benefited from a program.  The discussion here is 
inspired by those in Manski (1990) and Dominitz and Manski (1994), who provide 
careful economic (and econometric) analyses of responses to questions about fertility 
intentions and returns to schooling, respectively.  Our (very) simple model helps to 
structure the design and interpretation of our empirical work. 
 To begin, we suppose that respondents compare their observed utility given 
participation with the utility they would have experienced had they not participated.  Let 




{0,1}SRΔ ∈  denote the response to the self-evaluation question.  Then if respondents 
generate their answer by comparing the two utilities, we have  
 1 01( )SR U UΔ = > . 
 This formulation ignores the timing of any affects of participation on utility 
relative to the survey response.  Depending on the wording of the survey question and the 
respondents’ interpretation thereof, respondents may focus on impacts during the period 
up to the survey response, after the survey response, or some combination of the two.  In 
the JTPA context, we expect them to focus primarily on the effects of the program in the 
period leading up to the survey response.  Expanding our notation, let the subscript “b” 
denote the period before the survey response and the subscript “a” denote the period 
following the survey response.  We can then write 
1 0 1 1 0 01( ) 1( ( , ( )) ( , ( )))SR b a b aU U f U E U f U E UΔ = > = > , 
where ( )f   is an increasing function of both its arguments that maps the utility 
associated with participation or non-participation, both before and after the self-reported 
evaluation, into an overall valuation. 
 Next we consider what aspects of participation affect the utility levels of 
individuals.  In particular, we can decompose the impacts that individuals experience into 
components related to earnings or employment and a residual component that includes 
other direct costs and benefits as well as psychic costs and benefits.  Denote labor market 
impacts in the standard notation of the evaluation literature as  




where 1Y  denotes the labor market outcome in the treated state and 0Y  denotes the labor 
market outcome in the untreated state.  Similarly, denote the impact on all other 
determinants of participant utility by  
  1 0B B BΔ = − , 
where 1B  and 0B  parallel 1Y  and 0Y  in their interpretation.  In what follows, we will 
further distinguish between impacts realized before and after the survey response. 
 This decomposition into impacts on labor market outcomes and on all other 
outcomes that individuals care about corresponds to the components of the impacts that 
we can and cannot estimate econometrically using our data.  The outcomes we (and 
hopefully the respondents) have in mind other than labor market outcomes include direct 
costs of participating in training, such as transportation and childcare expenses, leisure 
time as in Greenberg (1997), as well as any psychic costs and benefits from participating.  
Rewriting the survey response function in terms of this additional notation yields 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 01( ) 1( ( , , ( ), ( )) ( , , ( ), ( ))SR b b a a b b a aU U U Y B E Y E B U Y B E Y E BΔ = > = > , 
or, alternatively 
(2.1) 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 01( ) 1( ( , , ( ), ( ))SR b b b b a a a aU U g Y Y B B E Y Y E B BΔ = > = − − − − . 
We estimate two variants of equation (2.1), one in cases where we have econometric 
estimates of 1 0( )b bY Y−  and another in cases where we examine simple proxies for 
1 0( )b bY Y− .  The next two subsections define these variants. 
 




In the case of the econometric impact estimates, we begin by assuming additive 
separability of the ( )g   function into components related to the labor market impact in 
the period prior to the survey and the remainder of the function.38  Assuming that the 
utility function is monotonic in its arguments, we can then rewrite the relationship to put 
the labor market impact on the left hand side, yielding 
(2.2) 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0( , , ( ), ( ))b b SR b b a a a aY Y h B B E Y Y E B B− = Δ − − − . 
We actually estimate linear versions of (2.2), given by 
(2.3)  1 0 0 1 ,b b SRY Y β β ε− = + Δ +  
where the hat on the impact denotes an estimate and where ε  includes the idiosyncratic 
pieces of 1 0b bB B− , 1 0( )a aE Y Y−  and 1 0( )a aE B B−  (the means are captured in the 
intercept) as well as the estimation error in the impact estimate and any approximation 
error due to inappropriate linearization. 
 We adopt this formulation in the case of the econometric impact estimates for two 
reasons.  First, because the econometric impact estimate includes estimation error, we 
want to put it on the left hand side for the usual reasons associated with measurement 
error.  In contrast, the participant evaluation has no measurement error; the variable is 
defined as the response to the survey question.39  We include no additional covariates on 
the right hand side because one of our two econometric estimates (described in detail in 
Section 2.4.1) consists of predicted subgroup experimental impact estimates.  To include 
both these predicted impacts and a set of observables would require excluding at least one 
                                                 
38 Additive separability is not innocuous here; it implies no complementarities between the component of 
the impacts we estimate and the other components of the impacts. 
39 The counter-argument in favor of making the participant evaluation the dependent variable despite the 





observable from this equation, but including it among the observables used to construct 
the subgroup impacts.  The observables available to us lack an obvious candidate for 
exclusion. 
 Under the first interpretation of our analysis, a weak estimated relationship in 
equation (2.3) indicates that participants care primarily about something other than 
earnings or employment impacts in the period prior to the survey.  This conclusion 
requires the qualification that we should not forget what lies in the error term.  Among 
the items in the error term, we would expect long term impacts to correlate positively 
with short term impacts; in contrast, impacts on leisure likely correlate negatively with 
impacts on labor market outcomes prior to the survey.  A weak relationship in (2.3) could 
thus also result from a combination of a positive direct effect of impacts on employment 
or earnings and a negative indirect effect on leisure, working through the correlation 
between the omitted impact on leisure and the included impact on employment or 
earnings.  Finally, in a common effect world in which the program has the same impact 
on everyone, or in which the impact varies but the idiosyncratic component is unknown 
even to participants ex-post, the true coefficient on the econometric estimate in (2.3) 
equals zero, since the consumer term would absorb the constant true impact. 
 Under the second interpretation of our analysis, the absence of a relationship 
between the participant impacts and our econometric estimates has an additional possible 
meaning, namely that the respondents have used some other, less cognitively taxing, 
estimator to (implicitly) construct their own impact estimates.  In this case, our 
econometric estimates will have a weak relationship with the participants’ survey 




variables that respondents might rely on, should display a strong relationship with the 
participants’ self-reported evaluations. 
 Finally, under either interpretation, large estimated standard errors suggest that 
our econometric impact estimates contain substantial estimation error. 
 
2.3.3. Econometric specification: impact proxies and performance measures 
In the case of the proxy variables and the simple performance measures that act as 
proxies for impacts, we adopt a more direct analog to equation (2.1) as our econometric 
specification.  In particular, we assume that  
(2.4)  0 1 1 01( ( ( )) 0)SR b b Xproxy Y Y Xβ β β εΔ = + − + + > , 
where ε  has a logistic distribution and X is a vector of observable characteristics with 
corresponding coefficients Xβ .  This is, of course, a standard logit model, which means 
that we can identify the coefficients only up to scale; we report estimates of mean 
derivatives below. 
 We employ (2.4) rather than (2.3) in this case because the proxies for impacts that 
we examine, such as labor market outcomes and the types of services received, unlike our 
econometric impact estimates, do not contain any measurement or estimation error.  In 
addition, because we measure these variables directly, rather than predicting them as a 
linear combination of the X, we can include conditioning variables X.  These conditioning 
variables soak up residual variance and thus make our estimates more precise.  They may 
also proxy, in part, for 1 0b bB B− , 1 0( )a aE Y Y−  and 1 0( )a aE B B− , thus clarifying the 





2.4 Econometric impact estimators 
This section describes the two econometric estimators that we apply to the experimental 
data to obtain impact estimates that vary among participants.  
 
2.4.1 Experimental impacts at the subgroup level 
The first method we employ for generating impact estimates that vary among participants 
takes advantage of the experimental data and the fact that random assignment remains 
valid for subgroups defined based on characteristics measured at or before random 
assignment, as discussed in, e.g. Heckman (1997b).   
 We estimate regressions of the form  
(2.5) 0i D i X i I i i iY D X D Xβ β β β ε= + + + + , 
where iY  is some outcome measure, iD  denotes assignment to the experimental treatment 
group, iX  denotes a vector of characteristics measured at or before random assignment 
and i iD X  represent interactions between the characteristics and the treatment indicator.  
It is these terms that yield variation in predicted impacts among individuals at the 
subgroup level.  The predicted impacts based on (2.5) for the treatment group members 
are given by 
(2.6)     1 0 ˆ ˆi i D I iY Y Xβ β− = + . 
 
 Though quite straightforward conceptually, our experimental subgroup impact 
estimates do raise a few important issues, which we now discuss.  The first issue 
concerns the choice of variables to interact with the treatment indicator.  We address this 




very different ways.  One set of estimates simply borrows the vector of characteristics 
employed by Heckman, Heinrich and Smith (2002) in their analysis of the JTPA data.  
The notes to Table 3 list these variables.  The second set of estimates utilizes a set of 
characteristics selected using the somewhat unsavory method of stepwise regression.  
While economists typically shun stepwise procedures as atheoretic, for our purposes here 
that bug becomes a feature, as it makes the variable selection procedure completely 
mechanical.  Thus, we can be assured of not having stacked the deck in one direction or 
another.  In both cases, we restrict our attention to main effects in order to keep the 
problem manageable. 
 We implement the stepwise procedure using essentially all of the variables from 
the BIF including variables measuring participant demographics, site, receipt of means-
tested monetary and in-kind transfers, labor force status and work history.  We include a 
missing indicator for each variable (to avoid losing a large fraction of the sample due to 
item non-response), and interact both the variables and the missing indicators with the 
treatment group indicator.  The stepwise procedure is restricted to keep or drop each 
variable along with the missing indicator and interactions with the treatment indicator as 
a group.  The stepwise procedure, which we perform separately for each of the four 
demographic groups, iteratively drops variables with coefficients not statistically 
different from zero in a regression with self-reported earnings in the 18 months after 
random assignment as the dependent variable.40 
 The second issue concerns the amount of subgroup variation in impacts in the 
NJS data within the four demographic groups – adult males and females ages 22 and 
                                                 
40 We employ the “step up” stepwise procedure as it has more power than the “step down” and “single 
step” procedures.  See Dunnett and Tamhane (1992) and Lui (1997) for details.  We set the p-value for 




older and male and female out-of-school youth ages 16-21 – for which both we and the 
official reports conduct separate analyses.  Although the NJS impact estimates differ 
substantially between youth and adults (and between male and female youth when 
considering the full samples), the experimental evaluation reports – see Exhibits 4.15, 
5.14, 6.6 and 6.5 in Bloom et al. (1993) for the 18 month impacts and Exhibits 5.8, 5.9, 
5.19 and 5.20 in Orr, et al. (1994) for the 30 month impacts – do not reveal a huge 
amount of statistically significant variation in impacts among subgroups defined by the 
observables available in the BIF.  If the impact does in fact vary a lot among individuals, 
but not in a way that is correlated with the characteristics we use in our model, then we 
may reach the wrong conclusions about participants’ ability to construct consistent 
estimates of earnings impacts.  This case has more than academic interest given that 
Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997) bound the variance of the impacts in the JTPA 
data away from zero for adult women; their lower bound on the standard deviation of the 
impacts equals $674.50 with a standard error of $137.53 (see their Table 3).41  In addition 
to simply keeping it in mind, we attempt to address this concern in part by examining the 
quantile treatment effect estimates described in the next section, which do vary a lot 
among participants, and by looking, in other work, at data from other experimental 
evaluations with more in the way of subgroup variation in impacts. 
 The third issue concerns an additional assumption that we must make in order to 
interpret our results in the way that we have described here.  A simple example illustrates 
the need for this assumption.  Consider two subgroups and suppose that participants care 
only about earnings impacts, and give a positive survey evaluation when they have an 
                                                 
41 Our subgroup impacts have standard deviations that range from $840 to $2600 depending on the 
demographic group and set of covariates.  The quantile treatment effects have lower standard deviations; 




earnings impact greater than zero.  In group one, suppose that 10 percent of the 
individuals have an impact of 1000 while 90 percent have an impact of zero.  The mean 
impact for subgroup one thus equals 100, while the fraction of positive participant 
evaluations equals 0.1.  In contrast, in group two, 20 percent of the individuals have an 
impact of 400 while 80 percent have an impact of zero.  The mean impact for subgroup 
two thus equals 80 while the fraction of positive participant evaluations equals 0.2.  In 
this example, when comparing across the two subgroups the mean impact varies 
inversely with the fraction with a positive impact.  In interpreting our results below, we 
assume that this case does not hold in the data.  Put differently, we assume that mean 
impacts and the fraction with a positive impact positively co-vary at the subgroup level. 
 
2.4.2 Quantile treatment effects 
The second econometric method we use to derive individual level treatment effect 
estimates relies on an additional non-experimental assumption.  In particular, we make 
the assumption of a perfect positive rank correlation between the outcomes in the treated 
and untreated states as described in Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997).  Intuitively, 
we assume that the expected counterfactual for an individual at a given percentile of the 
treatment group outcome distribution consists of the mean outcome at the same percentile 
of the control group outcome distribution.  One way to think about this assumption is that 
expected labor market outcomes depend on a single factor, so that individuals who do 
well in the treatment state also do well in the control state.  This represents a very 
different view of the world than, for example, the classic model of Roy (1951), but may 
represent a reasonable approximation for treatments, such as those offered by JTPA, that 




 Using this method, we estimate the impact for treated individual “i” with an 
outcome at percentile “j” of the treatment group outcome distribution as 
(2.7)   ( ) ( )1 0 1 0ˆ ˆ
j j
i iY Y Y Y− = − , 
where the superscript “ ( )j ” denotes the percentile.  This estimator underlies the literature 
on quantile treatment effects, as in Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (2002) and Bitler, 
Gelbach and Hoynes (2004), with the difference that rather than interpreting the estimates 
as the effect of treatment on the quantiles of the outcome distribution, we make the 
additional rank correlation assumption.  As discussed in Heckman, Smith and Clements 
(1997), the rank correlation assumption pins down the joint distribution of outcomes, 
which in turn pins down which quantile of the control outcome distribution provides the 
counterfactual for each quantile of the treatment outcome distribution, and allows us to 
assign impact estimates to specific individuals. 
 
2.5 The relationship between econometric impact estimates and participant evaluations 
 
2.5.1 Bivariate relationships 
 
We begin our analysis of the data from the NJS with simple bivariate relationships 
between mean experimental impacts for a variety of labor market outcomes and the 
fraction of participants with a positive self-reported evaluation for the four demographic 
groups in the experiment.  This analysis, presented in Table 2.1, extends that presented in 
Table 8.11 of Heckman and Smith (1998).  It represents a very basic application of the 
methodology outlined in Section 2.4.1. 
 The first four rows in Table 2.1 correspond to the four demographic groups 
described above.  The first column presents the fraction of the experimental treatment 




impacts on eight different earnings and employment outcomes.  The first two measures 
consist of self-reported earnings and any self-reported employment in the first 18 months 
after random assignment, which roughly corresponds to the period prior to the survey 
response for most sample members.  The second two measures consist of self-reported 
earnings and employment in month 18 after random assignment, thus focusing on the 
respondent’s status right around the time of the survey, rather than over the entire period 
since random assignment.  The remaining four measures repeat the first four, but now 
using the quarterly data from the matched UI earnings records rather than the self-
reported outcome data.  We include both sets because they appear substantially different 
at both the individual and aggregate levels – see the discussions in Smith (1997a,b) and 
Kornfeld and Bloom (1999).  The final row of Table 2.1 reports the correlation between 
the percent with a positive self-reported evaluation and the impact estimates in each 
column, as well as the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the population 
correlation coefficient equals zero. 
 Table 2.1 reveals that the subgroup with the worst impact on all eight of the 
outcome measures, namely male youth, has the second highest fraction with a positive 
self-reported evaluation.  The group with the highest fraction with a positive self-reported 
evaluation, namely female youth, often has the second-worst impact estimate.  Consistent 
with this basic pattern, the correlations reported in the last row end up negative six out of 
eight times, though we can never reject the null of a zero correlation (which is not 
surprising given that we have only four groups).  Thus, at this crude level, we find very 
little in the way of an association between the participant evaluations and the econometric 




and employment do not figure much in respondents’ evaluations of JTPA, or it may mean 
that respondents do not do a very good job of constructing the relevant counterfactual. 
 Looking specifically at the employment impacts, we might expect improved 
performance given the focus of the actual question on help in finding a job.  However, the 
signs of the correlation differ between employment measures for both data sets and 
between data sets for each measure.  More broadly, if we make the rank correlation 
assumption described in Section 2.4.2, the experimental impacts show that the program 
improved the employment situation of at most a few percent of the respondents, yet well 
over half self-report a positive impact on the survey. 
 Tables 2.2A, 2.2B, 2.2C and 2.2D report the results of a similar bivariate analysis 
using variation in the experimental impacts among subgroups of the four demographic 
groups.  Each table corresponds to one of the four demographic groups.  Within each 
table, the rows correspond to the variables used to define the subgroups and the columns 
refer to the same eight labor market outcome variables considered in Table 2.1.  The 
variables we use are race/ethnicity, years of schooling categories, marital status, time 
since last employment categories, site and age categories, where we omit the age variable 
for youth as the group is limited to individuals from 16 to 21 in any case.  Each entry in 
the table gives the estimated correlation coefficient between the fraction with a positive 
self-reported evaluation and the experimental impact estimate for the outcome variable 
for the column and for the subgroups defined by the row variable.   
 The bottom of each table also presents some summary statistics.  In particular, we 
present the number of positive and negative correlations in the table and, within each of 




For the adults, we would expect random variation to lead to 4 or 5 estimates statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level and 2 or 3 at the five percent level.  These vote counts 
provide a useful but imperfect summary of the 48 (or 40 for the youth) entries in each 
table.  In particular, the vote counts ignore the lack of independence among the estimates 
in each table and do not make any attempt to weight or value the estimates based on their 
precision. 
 The results in Table 2.2 paint a picture that looks a lot like the one from Table 2.1.  
No clear patterns emerge in terms of coefficient signs and the number of statistically 
significant correlations is roughly what one would expect if the true population 
coefficients all equaled zero.  So far, our findings strongly suggest either that participants 
weight labor market outcomes over the period prior to the survey very little in evaluating 
JTPA, or that participants do care about impacts but do a very bad job of estimating them, 
or that the experimental impact estimates based on subgroup variation have only a weak 
correlation with actual individual impacts. 
 
2.5.2 Regression results for experimental subgroup estimates 
we now to turn evidence from regressions of estimated impacts on each of the labor 
market outcomes considered in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 on the indicator variable for a positive 
self-reported evaluation.  In terms of our earlier discussion, we report estimates of 1β  
from equation (2.3), where the dependent variable consists of an experimental impact 
estimate based on subgroup variation in impacts as in equations (2.5) and (2.6).  These 
estimates appear in Table 2.3, where each entry in the table represents a separate 




demographic groups has two columns of estimates, one for each of the two sets of 
covariates used in estimating equation (2.5).  The columns headed by (2.1) contain the 
estimates using the covariates from Heckman, Heinrich and Smith (2002), while the 
columns headed by (2.2) contain the estimates using the covariate set chosen by the 
stepwise procedure.  The final two rows of the table summarize the evidence in each 
column; in particular, they give the numbers of positive and negative estimates and, 
within each category, the number of statistically significant estimates at the five and ten 
percent levels. 
 The evidence in Table 2.3 suggests little, if any, relationship between the 
experimental impact estimates based on subgroup variation and the self-reported 
evaluations.  While the estimates of β1 lean negative in the aggregate, only a handful of 
the estimates reach conventional levels of statistical significance (and not all of those fall 
on the negative side of the ledger).  The regression evidence thus compounds the 
evidence from the simple bivariate relationships examined in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.  Either 
the participants do not weigh labor market impacts very heavily in their response, or else 
their impact estimates (or ours) do not do a very good job of capturing the actual impacts. 
 
2.5.3 Results based on quantile treatment effect estimates 
This section presents evidence on the relationship between self-reported effects and 
impact estimates constructed under the perfect positive rank correlation assumption 
described in Section 2.4.2.  We present these results in both graphical and tabular form.  
Figures 1A to 1D present the evidence in graphical form, with one figure for each 
demographic group.  The horizontal axis in each figure corresponds to percentiles of the 




every fifth percentile (5, 10, 15, … , 95) constructed as in equation (2.7).  The broken line 
in each graph represents an estimate of the fraction with a positive self-reported 
evaluation at every fifth percentile.  For percentile “j”, this estimate consists of the 
fraction of the treatment group sample members in the interval between percentile “j-2.5” 
and percentile “j+2.5” with a positive self-reported evaluation.  If the assumptions 
underlying the percentile difference estimator hold, if participants care about labor 
market outcomes in answering the survey question, and if participants consistently 
estimate their own impacts, then the two lines should move together in the figures. 
 Several features of the figures merit notice.  First, in the lower percentiles in each 
figure the econometric impact estimate equals zero.  This results from the fact that the 
lowest percentiles in both the treated and untreated outcome distributions have zero 
earnings in the 18 months after random assignment; the difference between the two then 
equals zero as well.  Surprisingly, a substantial fraction (over half in all four demographic 
groups) of treatment group members at these percentiles respond positively to the survey 
evaluation question, even though they have zero earnings in the 18 months after random 
assignment.  This suggests that respondents view the question as asking about longer 
term labor market impacts and not solely as a narrow question about finding a job 
immediately after participation in the program. 
 Second, the fraction with a positive self-reported evaluation has remarkably little 
variation across percentiles of the outcome distribution.  For all four demographic groups, 
it remains within a band from 0.6 to 0.8.  For the adults, the mean increases with the 




 Third, no obvious relationship between the two variables emerges from the 
figures for three of the four demographic groups.  Adult women constitute the exception; 
for them, both variables increase with the percentile of the outcome distribution.  More 
specifically, for adult women, both variables have a higher level for percentiles where the 
impact estimate exceeds zero.  Within the two intervals defined by this point, both 
variables remain more or less constant. 
 Table 2.4 presents some of the numbers underlying the figures.  In particular, the 
first five rows present the values for the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles.  The last 
two rows of the table give the correlation between the quantile treatment effects and the 
fraction with a positive self-reported evaluation for each group (and the corresponding p-
value from a test of the null that the correlation equals zero) along with the estimated 
coefficient from a regression of the quantile treatment effects on the fraction with a 
positive self-reported evaluation (and the corresponding standard error).  The correlation 
and regression estimates quantify and confirm what the figures indicate: a strong positive 
relationship for adult women, a weak and statistically insignificant positive relationship 
for adult men, and moderately strong and negative relationship for male youth and a 
similar, but not statistically significant, relationship for female youth.  Although we find a 
bit more here than in the estimates that rely on subgroup variation, once again the data do 
not suggest a strong, consistent relationship between the econometric impact estimates 
and the self-reported evaluations. 
 





In this section, we present evidence on the extent to which simple proxies that 
respondents might use in constructing their impact estimates predict a positive self-
reported evaluation.  The proxies we examine include input (training type) measures, 
labor market outcome (employment and earnings) measures and simple before-after 
differences in labor market outcomes.  For each of these proxies, we present estimates of 
equation (2.4) in Section 2.3.3.  If the proxy variables drive the self-reported evaluations, 
this suggests that participants rely on these readily accessible variables in answering the 
survey evaluation question instead of thinking hard about their counterfactual outcome. If 
respondents really do know the impacts, then proxies poorly correlated with the actual 
impacts should have little explanatory power.   
 Two important caveats weaken this argument.  First, if we have imprecise (or 
inconsistent, in the case of the quantile treatment effects) econometric estimates, then we 
have no way of knowing the extent to which the proxies correlate with actual impacts; 
our view that they do not relies solely on our priors.  Second, particularly in the case of 
the input measures, the proxies may correlate with both the psychic and the direct costs 
and benefits of participation not captured in the labor market outcomes we examine.  For 
example, classroom training may be more fun than, say, job search assistance.  
Alternatively, classroom training may have higher direct costs if it takes place at a distant 
community college while job search assistance takes place at a local neighborhood 
organization.  With both the big picture and these caveats in mind, we now turn to our 
results. 
 




Tables 2.5 presents logit estimates of equation (2.4) that include not one but two 
measures of the training received by JTPA treatment group members.  We interpret these 
inputs as potential proxies for impacts.  Respondents receiving only inexpensive services 
(or no services at all) might reason that as a result the program can have had little if any 
impact, while participants who receive expensive services such as CT-OS or OJT may 
draw the opposite conclusion. 
The two measures of service receipt derive from self-reports collected in the NJS 
follow-up surveys and from administrative data from the individual sites participating in 
the experiment.42  As shown in Smith and Whalley (2005), these two measures differ 
substantially; as a result we do not run into collinearity problems when including them 
both.  The two data sources code the service types somewhat differently; for 
comparability and ease of interpretation, we employ just five service types: CT-OS, 
OJT/WE (which is almost all OJT), JSA, ABE and “other”.  We code a dummy variable 
for each service type in each data source indicating whether or not the respondent 
received it; a respondent who received more than one service type in a given data source 
gets coded based on the training type they receive in their first spell. 
 The logit models presented in Table 2.5 also include a variety of background 
variables.  These variables play two roles.  First, we expect them to pick up parts of the 
overall impact of participation unrelated to the labor market outcomes we examine.  For 
example, the site dummies will pick up differences in the friendliness and efficiency of 
site operation as perceived by the respondents.  The variable “work for pay”, which is an 
                                                 
42 In fact, two versions of the administrative data on service receipt exist, one created by MDRC and one 
created by Abt Associates.  Both rely on the original MIS files from the 16 sites in the experiment.  Our 
experience with both files, described in detail in Smith and Whalley (2005), leads us to employ the Abt 




indicator variable for whether or not the respondent has ever worked for pay, relates to 
the opportunity cost of participation, as does the variable for having a young child.  The 
AFDC receipt at time of random assignment variable captures variation in the cost of 
classroom training due to the availability of an income source not tied to employment.  In 
order to avoid losing a large fraction of the sample due to item non-response, we recode 
missing values to zero and include indicator variables for missing values of each variable. 
 Each column in Table 2.5 corresponds to one of the four demographic groups.  
The table presents mean derivatives, estimated standard errors for the mean derivatives in 
parentheses and the p-value of a test of the null hypothesis that the mean derivative 
equals zero in square brackets.  Table 2.6 summarizes the results in Table 2.5 by 
presenting test statistics and p-values from tests of the joint null that the mean derivatives 
for groups of related covariates (e.g. all of the self-reported training type variables) equal 
zero. 
 Consider the variables other than the training type variables first.  Although they 
are not shown in the table, the site variables have a strong effect on the probability of a 
positive self-reported evaluation.  The magnitudes vary a lot as well; for example, for 
adult males the coefficients on the site dummies range from -0.257 to 0.093.  Moreover, 
Table 2.6 shows that these variables are strongly statistically significant as a group.  We 
interpret this as indicating that respondents take account of non-pecuniary aspects of their 
JTPA experience, such as the friendless and efficiency of the staff and the attractiveness 
and ease of access of the JTPA office and the local service providers.  However, these 




unlikely given the findings in Section 2.5.2) or for other features of the local 
environment, such as the state of the economy, that affect respondent’s experiences. 
 With the exception of age for adults, race for youth, and age and education for 
female youth, the other demographic variables play surprisingly little role in determining 
the probably of a positive self-reported evaluation.  Among adults, age has a strong 
negative effect on the probability of a positive self-evaluation, while black male youth 
and Hispanic male and female youth have higher probabilities of a positive response.  
The limited role played by background characteristics in the analysis surprised us. 
 In contrast to the background characteristics, the training type variables play a 
major role in determining individual self-reported evaluations.  Table 2.6 shows that, 
taken together, both the self-reported and administrative training type variables achieve 
high levels of statistical significance for adults, and the administrative measures do so for 
youth.   
 Smith and Whalley (2005) show that the self-reported and administrative 
measures of receipt of classroom training in occupational skill tend to agree; as such, we 
can (as a crude approximation) simply add their coefficients.  Doing so reveals that CT-
OS has a large positive effect on the probability of a positive self-reported evaluation for 
all four groups.  Subsidized on-the-job training reports often do not coincide in the two 
data sources; here we find that self-reported OJT has a strong (and usually statistically 
significant) positive effect, as does administratively reported OJT!  CT-OS and OJT 
generally represent the largest resource investment in the JTPA participant; the 
participants appear to recognize this and use it as a proxy for impacts in responding to the 




 Job search assistance, the cheapest of the services, elicits less of a positive effect.  
This training type also tends to get reported differently in the two data sources.  Here, 
except for self-reported JSA for adult males and administratively reported JSA for adult 
females, we find modest and statistically insignificant effects.  Adult Basic Education 
(ABE) and “other” training do not yield precise estimates, except for “other” training in 
the administrative data, which has, somewhat puzzlingly, a negative and statistically 
significant effect for adult women and a positive and statistically effect for female youth.  
These two training types have, in general, smaller sample sizes than the others, which 
may account for the imprecision of the estimates. 
 Overall, the training type variables matter in predicting a positive self-reported 
evaluation in a manner consistent with the view that respondents use the intensity of the 
services they receive – the inputs – as a proxy for the impact the services have upon 
them. 
 Tables 2.7 and 2.8 describe a set of logit estimates of equation (2.4) in which we 
include the same background variables as in the models of Table 2.5 but add various 
versions of 1Y , the labor market outcome in the treated state.  Respondents may reason 
that if they have done well in the labor market over the period between random 
assignment and the survey or if they are doing well around the time of the survey, then 
the program must have benefited them.  Respondents who have not done well may draw 
the opposite conclusion.  As with the training type variables, the outcomes represent an 
easily observable proxy for impacts that respondents may rely in when determining their 




 The top panel of Table 2.7 reports estimates from a specification in which we  
divide self-reported earnings in the 18 months after random assignment into five 
categories: zero, and four quartiles of the distribution of positive earnings, and then 
include dummy variables for four of the five categories, with the highest category as the 
excluded category.  The second panel of Table 2.7 corresponds to a similar specification 
but using earnings in the six calendar quarters after random assignment from the UI 
administrative data.  The last two lines report estimates from a specification that includes 
a dummy variable for any employment in the 18 months after random assignment, again 
measured first based on the survey data and then based on the UI administrative data.  
Table 2.8 summarizes the evidence in Table 2.7 as well as evidence from a series of 
alternative specifications not reported here for reasons of space.  As in Table 2.6, the 
summary takes the form of p-values from tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficients 
or coefficients corresponding to a specific labor market outcome measure equal zero. 
 The broad picture from Table 2.7 is that labor market outcomes appear to predict 
self-reported evaluations.  This is particularly true for adults.  For both adult males and 
adult females and for both earnings measures, all of the estimated coefficients are 
negative (as expected when compared to the highest earnings quintile) and most are 
statistically significant.  Also, broadly speaking, the estimated coefficients decrease as 
earnings increase, as expected.  For youth, the coefficients also turn out largely negative 
(indicating a positive relationship) but rather imprecisely estimated.  The self-reported 
employment measure also has a strong positive and statistically significant relationship to 




latter finding may result from measurement error in UI employment due to its omission 
of government jobs and informal jobs. 
 Turning to Table 2.8, which summarizes a large number of specifications via chi-
square tests and associated p-values (including both the specifications reported in Table 
2.7 and many not reported there for reasons of space), we find similar patterns.  The 
relationships tend to be statistically stronger for adults than for youth, and stronger for the 
measures based on the self-reported data than on the UI data.  Also, the earnings 
measures tend to yield more statistically significant relationships than the employment 
measures, especially for measures that consider outcomes just around the time of the 
survey. 
 Overall, this section presents compelling evidence that simple proxies for impacts 
in the form of inputs and outcomes predict self-reported evaluations.  This pattern of 
findings lends support to the view that respondents adopt cognitively simple alternatives 
to the difficult task of trying to construct a counterfactual outcome when answering the 
self-evaluation question.   
 At the same time, the role of the input measures may also reflect, in part, various 
non-pecuniary aspects of the services received.  For example, in addition to representing 
a larger financial investment, respondents who receive classroom training may have more 
fun in their JTPA experience than those who receive, say, job search assistance.  Also, 
outcomes may proxy in part for impacts (and with less measurement error than the impact 
measures we consider earlier in the chapter); in a world where the counterfactual is zero 
earnings – the correct world for some fraction of the treatment group – outcomes and 





2.6.3. Results with before-after comparisons of labor market outcomes 
In addition to inputs and outputs, survey respondents may employ simple before-after 
comparisons of outcomes as a (cognitively as well as conceptually) simple estimator.  Of 
course, before-after comparisons, despite their simplicity, provide consistent estimates of 
program impacts under the condition that the “before” period outcome consistently 
estimates the outcome that would have been realized in the absence of treatment.  
Heckman and Smith (1999) show that this condition fails rather dramatically in the NJS 
data, with the result that, due to “Ashenfelter’s dip” in earnings in the pre-program 
period, before-after impact estimates tend to have a strong upward bias.  In this section, 
we relate several before-after impact estimates on employment and earnings to our self-
reported evaluation measure. 
 Tables 2.9 and 2.10 present estimates of logit models with the self-reported 
evaluation measure as the dependent variable and three different measures of before-after 
earnings changes as independent variables, along with all of the variables in Column 1 of 
Table 2.5.  The first measure, for which the estimates appear in Table 2.9, consists of the 
difference in average monthly earnings between the 12 months before random 
assignment and the 18 months after random assignment.  We can use only the 12 months 
before random assignment due to the limitations of the survey data on pre-random 
assignment earnings for the treatment group.43   The second and third measures, for 
which the estimates appear in Table 2.10, rely on the UI earnings data.  The first measure, 
in the top panel of Table 2.10, consists of mean monthly earnings in the six calendar 
quarters after random assignment minus mean monthly earnings in the six calendar 
                                                 




quarters after random assignment.  The second measure, denoted UI(2) in the lower panel 
of Table 2.10, consists of the difference in mean monthly earnings between just the sixth 
quarter before and the sixth quarter before random assignment.  In each case, we let the 
data speak to the functional form by including indicator variables for quintiles of the 
before-after difference. 
 We find strong evidence that before-after differences in labor market outcomes 
predict self-reported impacts.  For the self-reported measure, the relationship is clearest 
for the adult females and the male youth, where the estimated coefficients increase 
monotonically (or almost so) and are statistically and substantively significant for the 
upper quintiles.  Even stronger findings appear for the UI earnings difference measure in 
the top panel of Table 2.10, with large, and almost always statistically significant, 
coefficients for all four groups for the two upper quintiles.  For male youth, the key 
difference seems to be between the lowest quintile and the other four; the four 
coefficients are all relatively large, all about equal and all statistically significant.  For the 
other three groups, there is a general pattern of increasing coefficients as you move down 
the table.  The results for the UI(2) measure in the bottom panel of Table 2.10 are weaker, 
in both a substantive and a statistical sense, than those in the top panel; this suggests that 
respondents use outcomes over the entire pre- and post-random assignment periods in 
constructing their implicit before-after estimates of program impact. 
 Given that the second of the two survey questions that compose our self-reported 
evaluation measure asks directly about finding a job, in Table 2.11 we consider its 
relationship to before-after employment changes.  We coded an employment status 




months after random assignment.  This yields four patterns.  We include dummy 
variables for three of the four patterns, with employed at both points in time as the 
omitted pattern.  The findings here are, perhaps, less strong than expected.  In general, 
relative to the always employed, those who are never employed or who lose a job tend to 
have less positive self-reported evaluations. For the adults, those who gain a job tend to 
be somewhat more positive.  However, only a handful of the differences achieve 
statistical significance.  Measurement error in the “after” employment status may account 
for our weak results.  By looking at employment around the time of the survey, we have 
given the respondents plenty of time to lose jobs that JTPA helped them find and, in the 
case of dropouts, to find jobs without the help of JTPA. 
 Finally, Table 2.12 presents the results of chi-squared tests for the joint 
significance of the before-after difference variables considered in Tables 2.9, 2.10 and 
2.11.  The test statistics and p-values in this table confirm that respondents’ self-reported 
evaluations depend (in a statistical sense) on these before-after differences.  Indeed, the 
joint tests for the employment change variable look stronger than the individual t-tests, 
suggesting that our omitted group lies in the middle of the categories in terms of its effect 
on the self-evaluation measure.  Overall, the findings in this section lend support to the 
view that respondents implicitly or explicitly use natural and cognitively simple (but 
nonetheless quite biased) before-after comparisons in constructing their self-reported 
evaluations. 
 




In this section we present results on the relationship between participant self-reported 
evaluations and performance measures based on program outcomes commonly used in 
employment and training programs both in the U.S. and elsewhere.  Performance 
standards systems attempt to provide information on the impacts of programs quickly and 
at low cost by relying on crude proxies.  In this sense, as the reader will quickly discern, 
some of the performance measures are fairly closely related to the outcome proxies 
examined in Section 2.6.2.  In the JTPA program, the performance measures had real 
effects on site budgets; sites that did well on them received budgetary rewards while sites 
that did exceptionally poorly could receive “technical assistance” and also experienced 
the threat of formal reorganization.  See, e.g., Heckman, Heinirch and Smith (2002), 
Heckman and Heinrich (2005) and Barnow and Smith (2004) for more detailed 
descriptions of the performance standards systems in JTPA, WIA and other programs, for 
evidence that the usual performance measures have little, if any, relationship to the actual 
impacts of the program, for evidence of strategic behavior by program staff in response to 
the incentives provided by the JTPA performance standards system, and for additional 
pointers to the literature. 
 The performance measures we examine here are subsets of those included in the 
JTPA and WIA performance standards systems.  From the JTPA system we consider 
employment status at termination from the program, wages at termination from the 
program (which is defined only for those employed at termination), employment at 
“follow-up”, which is 13 weeks after termination, and weekly earnings (not including 
zeros) at follow-up.  We use self-reported information to construct the JTPA performance 




at termination, employment at six months after termination conditional on employment at 
termination (this measure aims to count “retention”, although it does not require the 
individual to stay at the same job), and the difference in quarterly earnings between the 
two calendar quarters after termination and the two quarters prior to random assignment.  
Note that the earnings gain measure, which was an innovation in the WIA system relative 
to JTPA, exploits the pre-program dip in mean earnings discussed in, e.g. Heckman and 
Smith (1999), to obtain a measure that will invariably suggest positive earnings impacts 
whether the program works or not.  We follow the WIA program in relying mainly on the 
UI earnings records in constructing the WIA performance measures for our sample. 
 The top panel of Table 2.13 presents results based on estimating logit models with 
self-reported evaluations as the dependent variable and one of the performance measures, 
again including all of the variables in Table 2.5 as covariates.  The bottom panel reports 
results from similar models using the WIA performance measures.   
 Three patterns emerge from the findings in Table 2.13.  First, among the JTPA 
measures, employment at termination and employment at follow-up are significantly 
related, in both senses, to self-reported evaluations.  The estimated mean change in the 
probability of a positive self-evaluation due to employment at termination ranges from 
0.08 for male youth to 0.13 for adult females.  Employment at follow-up shows a 
similarly strong relationship.  Second, the WIA measures, other than the earnings change 
measure, show little in the way of a consistent relationship with the self-reported 
evaluation measure.  In particular, using the UI earnings data to measure employment at 
termination rather than survey data on employment spells adds enough measurement 




significant only for adult males.  Third, the relationship between self-reported evaluations 
and the performance measures appears stronger for women than for men. 
 Overall, Table 2.13 yields a mixed picture.  Some performance measures based on 
labor market outcomes have substantively and statistically significant relationships with 
self-reported evaluations but even these account for only a modest fraction of the 
variance.  Thus, the self-reported evaluations capture something related to, but very 




Broadly speaking, and putting aside the material in Section 2.7 regarding the performance 
standards, we have two main findings.  The first is that self-reported evaluations by 
treatment group members from the JTPA experimental evaluation have, in general, little 
if any relationship to either experimental impact estimates at the subgroup level or to 
what we regard as relatively plausible econometric impact estimates based on percentile 
differences.  The second is that the self-reported evaluation measures do have consistent 
relationships with crude proxies for impacts, such as measures of service type (a proxy 
for the amount of money spent), labor market outcome levels (which measure impacts 
only if the counterfactual state consists of no employment or earnings, which it does not 
for the vast majority of our sample), and before-after comparisons.   
 Taken together, these two findings provide strong support for the view that 
respondents avoid the cognitive burden associated with trying to construct (implicitly or 




control group and thus excluded from JTPA.  Instead, they appear to use readily available 
proxies and simple heuristics to conclude, for example, that if they are employed at the 
time of the survey or if their earnings have risen relative to the period prior to random 
assignment, that the program probably helped them find a job or get a better job.  At the 
same time, our evidence does not rule out the view that respondents consider factors in 
their answers not captured in our experimental and econometric impact estimates, such as 
expected impacts in later periods.  The proxy variables still leave much variation in the 
self-evaluation measure to be explained by other factors. 
 Overall, we conclude that participant self-evaluation measures of the type 
analyzed here represent a very poor substitute for rigorous experimental or non-
experimental estimates of program impact.  At the same time, to our knowledge this 
chapter represents the first attempt to seriously study what these questions actually 
measure.  The literature on using surveys to measure expectations, as discussed in 
Manski (2004), provides some reason for thinking that more sophisticated survey 
questions might do a better job of measuring the underlying objects of interest.  Without 
additional research, we hesitate at this point to make any claims about the broadest of the 
questions that motivated this study, namely whether or not individuals can effectively 









1. Data Appendix for Chapter 1 
 
1.1 Sample Selection 
 
The PSID full-sample (both the main and SEO oversample) contains 63453 
individuals ever in the sample from 1977 to 1992.  I drop those who are not household 
heads for at least 9 years between 1977 and 1992 (this also drops the 1990 Latino 
subsample) and I am left with 5015 individuals in the 1977 cross-section.  I then drop 
female individuals and those who are not aged 22 to 45 in 1977, so that the sample only 
includes those aged 22 to 60 in every year.  I am then left with 1894 individuals in the 
1977 cross-section.  Dropping those who are not white or black, those ever a student and 
those with missing education leaves 1830 individuals in the 1977 cross-section.  This 
final sample also contains 1601 individuals in the 1992 cross-section. 
 
1.2 Risk Preference Measures 
 
PSID Risk Preference Question (M1):  
Now I have another kind of question for you.  Suppose that you had a job that guaranteed 
you income for life equal to your current, total income. And that job was [your/your 
family's] only source of income. Then you are given the opportunity to take a new, and 
equally good, job with a 50-50 chance that it will double your income and spending 
power. But there is a 50-50 chance that it will cut your income and spending power by a 








The response 'INAP' indicates that the question is inappropriate, the response 'DK' 
indicates that the respondent does not know, and the response 'RF' indicates that the 
respondent refused to answer.  The next questions ask the respondent about different 
losses in spending of either a 50 percent, 20 percent, 10 percent and 75 percent cut in 
income.  Which questions the respondent answers depends on their responses to the 
previous questions.  By using the responses to all the questions asked a measure of an 
individual's risk preference is constructed based on the method in Barsky et al. (1997).  
This method assumes a CES utility function, corrects for measurement error, and 
classifies individuals into one of four risk aversion categories: "very high", "high", 
"moderate" and "low" each with an associated coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
 





log (annual labor and social insurance income)  
= log(annual labor income + annual workers compensation income + annual 
unemployment insurance income + annual foodstamp income + annual AFDC income + 
annual SSI income) 
 
Recoded log (annual labor and social insurance income)  
= log(annual labor income + annual workers compensation income + annual 
unemployment insurance income + annual foodstamp income + annual AFDC income + 
annual SSI income) if log (annual labor and social insurance income) > 0 
= 1 otherwise 
 
log (annual labor income)  
= log(annual labor income) 
 
log(wage)  
= log(annual labor income/annual hours worked) 
 
weeks unemployed  
= annual number of weeks respondent reports being unemployed or laid off 
 
1.4 Labor Income Volatility Estimation Details 
 
In this section I provide the estimation details of the individual volatility measures 
which I utilize.  I first estimate the equation for all individuals in the panel from 1977 to 
1992, 
ittititititit Xageageyy εγ ++Φ+Φ=− − 213 * , 
Where:  
yit is the labor income variable for individual i in period t 
ageit is a matrix containing the variables age, age2, age3, and age4 for individual i in 
period t 
Xit is a matrix containing the dummy variables high school graduate only, some college, 
college graduate, and black for individual i in period t 
γt are year fixed effects 
 
The next step is to use the coefficient estimates to obtain an estimate of the residual for 
individual i in period t as itε̂ , square them to obtain
2ˆitε , I take the average for each 
individual and divide by two to obtain 2ˆ iσ , the measure of labor income volatility which I 












2.1 Sample Selection Criteria for the Samples Used  
 
Our data set combines self-reported information from the Background Information Form, 
completed at or near the time of random assignment and the First Follow-Up Survey, 
collected around 18 months after random assignment with administrative data on 
quarterly earnings from matched UI wage records.   
 
The full experimental sample contains 6639 observations in the control group and 13972 
observations in the treatment group.  If I restrict our sample to only those with valid self-
reported earnings for the 18 months after random assignment I lose 2080 observations 
from the control group and 4329 observations from the treatment group.   If I instead 
restrict the sample to only those with valid UI earnings over the six quarters after random 
assignment I lose 122 observations from the control group and 232 observations from the 
treatment group.  I only require sample members to have valid values for earnings for the 
analysis in question; that is, I use all available observations for a given dependent 
variable.  The analyses presented in Tables 5 to 13 require only the data from the 
experimental treatment group. 
 
Our self-reported earnings data consists of the self-reported data used in Bloom et al. 
(1993), the official 18-month impact report.  The data I use include the recoded values for 
outliers (which were examined individually and by hand by staff of Abt Associates) but 
do not include the imputed values based on the matched UI earnings records that they 
employed in some of their analyses.  This earnings variable is not available on the public 
use CD but is available from the authors by request.   
 
The matched administrative data from UI records consists of earnings in each calendar 
quarter.  As a result, for some sample members, the six calendar quarters after the 
calendar quarter of random assignment (the period used in some of our dependent 
variables from the UI data) will cover a slightly different set of months than the 18 
months after the month after random assignment (the period covered in some of our 
dependent variables from the self-reported data). 
 
I do not drop observations with missing values of covariates from the sample for any of 
our analyses; instead I include dummy variables for those with missing values of the 
covariates used in each analysis.  If I had instead listwise deleted observations from the 
sample having any missing value for the covariates I would lose 18327 observations out 
of the 20601 observations in the full experimental sample. 
 
2.2 Variable Definitions 
 
Predicted impact:  This consists of the experimentally estimated predicted impact of the 
program for an individual based on either the individual’s measured characteristics or the 
individual’s quantile in the untreated outcome distribution.  
 
Percent positive self-evaluation: This is the mean of a binary indicator for a positive 





Earnings one: This is total earnings over the 18 months after random assignment based on 
the self-reported earnings data. 
 
Employment one: This is a binary variable indicating any employment over the 18 
months after random assignment using self-reported earnings data.  The variable equals 
one if self-reported earnings over the 18 months after random assignment are positive and 
zero otherwise.   
 
Earnings two: This is total earnings in the 18th month after random assignment based on 
the self-reported earnings data.   
 
Employment two: This is a binary variable indicating employment in month 18 after 
random assignment based on the self-reported earnings data.  The variable equals one if 
self-reported earnings in the 18th month after random assignment are positive and zero 
otherwise.   
 
Earnings three: This is total earnings in the six calendar quarters after the calendar quarter 
of random assignment based on the matched UI administrative earnings data. 
 
Employment three: This is a binary variable indicating any employment over the six 
calendar quarters after the calendar quarter of random assignment based on the matched 
UI administrative earnings data.  This variable equals one if UI earnings over the six 
calendar quarters after the calendar quarter of random assignment are positive and zero 
otherwise.   
 
Earnings four: This is total earnings in month 18 after random assignment based on the 
matched UI administrative earnings data.   
 
Employment four: This is a binary variable indicating any employment in the sixth 
calendar quarter after the calendar quarter of random assignment based on the matched 
UI administrative earnings data.  This variable equals one if UI earnings in the sixth 






Table 1.1: Transitory Variance of Log Labor plus Social Insurance Income, 


















White High School Dropout 28.34 
(3.22) 








White College Graduate 19.84 
(2.05) 

















Black College Graduate 9.45 
(2.85) 






Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.   The entries in the tables are the means and 
standard errors (in parentheses) multiplied by 100.  The sample contains 1259 white individuals and 562 
black individuals.  Log annual labor and social insurance income is measured in 1992 dollars using the 












Table 1.2:  The Effect of Education on Labor Income Risk, By Race 
Dependent Variable: Transitory Variance of Log Labor plus Social Insurance Income  
OLS Estimates (Standard Errors) 
 
Race: White Black 
Model: (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 

































































N 1259 1259 562 562 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  Estimates and standards errors (in parentheses) 
presented are multiplied by 100.  * indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10% level.   ** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  All 
specifications also include a constant, age, age squared, a missing risk tolerance measure dummy, and a 
seven dummies for the years in included in the sample.  Demographic and regional controls include: 
dummies for marital status, a variable for the number of members in the household, three dummy variables 
for the census regions, and a missing census region dummy.  All estimates weight observations by 
























Table 1.3:  The Effect of High School Graduation on Labor Income Risk, By Race 
Dependent Variable: Transitory Variance of Log Labor plus Social Insurance Income  
OLS and IV Estimates (Standard Errors) 
 
Race: White Black 
Model: (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
PANEL A: OLS 
 
























































N 1259 1259 562 562 
 
PANEL B: IV  
 









































































Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  Estimates and standards errors (in parentheses) 
presented are multiplied by 100.  * indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10% level.   ** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  All 
specifications also include a constant, age, age squared, a missing risk tolerance measure dummy, and a 
seven dummies for the years in included in the sample.  Demographic and regional controls include: 
dummies for marital status, a variable for the number of members in the household, three dummy variables 


























































Table 1.4:  The Effect of Education on Labor Income Risk, By Race 
Dependent Variable: Transitory Variance of Log Labor plus Social Insurance Income  
with Recoded Zero Values Included 
OLS Estimates (Standard Errors) 
 
Race: White Black 
Model: (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 











  -92.21 
(69.74) 



















































N 1263 1263 567 567 
Mean of Labor Income Risk 164.89 246.49 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  Estimates and standards errors (in parentheses) 
presented are multiplied by 100.  The labor and social insurance income variable has zero values recoded as 
one so that the log of labor and social insurance income is defined for those with zero for this variable. * 
indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level.    ** indicates that the 
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  All specifications also include a constant, 
age, age squared, a missing risk tolerance measure dummy, and a seven dummies for the years in included 
in the sample.  Demographic and regional controls include: dummies for marital status, a variable for the 
number of members in the household, three dummy variables for the census regions, and a missing census 
region dummy.  All estimates weight observations by sampling weights.  Log annual labor income is 

















Table 1.5:  The Effect of Education on Labor Income Risk, By Race 
Dependent Variable: Transitory Variance of Log Labor plus Social Insurance Income 
Minus Federal Income Tax 
OLS Estimates (Standard Errors) 
 
Race: White Black 
Model: (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 












  -15.95** 
(7.19) 



















































N 1259 1259 562 562 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  Estimates and standards errors (in parentheses) 
presented are multiplied by 100 * indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10% level.   ** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  All 
specifications also include a constant, age, age squared, a missing risk tolerance measure dummy, and a 
seven dummies for the years in included in the sample.  Demographic and regional controls include: 
dummies for marital status, a variable for the number of members in the household, three dummy variables 
for the census regions, and a missing census region dummy.  All estimates weight observations by 
















Table 1.6:  The Effect of Education on Labor Income Risk, By Race 
Dependent Variable: Transitory Variance of Log Labor Income Only 
OLS Estimates (Standard Errors) 
 
Race: White Black 
Model: (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 












  -2.75 
(10.71) 



















































N 1255 1255 550 550 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  Estimates and standards errors (in parentheses) 
presented are multiplied by 100 * indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10% level.   ** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  All 
specifications also include a constant, age, age squared, a missing risk tolerance measure dummy, and a 
seven dummies for the years in included in the sample.  Demographic and regional controls include: 
dummies for marital status, a variable for the number of members in the household, three dummy variables 
for the census regions, and a missing census region dummy.  All estimates weight observations by 





















Table 1.7:  Sources of Labor Income Risk, by Race and Education 
 
 Transitory 
Variance of  



















































































N 1805 1830 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.   The entries in the tables are the means and 
standard errors in parentheses (both multiplied by 100 for log wage).  The estimated presented for the 
variance of log wages are based on a sample of 1255 white and 550 black individuals, and the estimated 
presented for the variance of weeks unemployed are based on a sample of 1263 whites and 567 blacks.  All 
estimates weight observations by sampling weights.   Log wages are measured in 1992 dollars using the 




Table 1.8:  The Effect of Education on Wage Risk, By Race 
Dependent Variable: Transitory Variance of Log Wage 
OLS Estimates (Standard Errors) 
 
Race: White Black 
Model: (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
































































N 1255 1255 550 550 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  Estimates and standards errors (in parentheses) 
presented are multiplied by 100.  * indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 
10% level.   ** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  All 
specifications also include a constant, age, age squared, a missing risk tolerance measure dummy, and a 
seven dummies for the years in included in the sample.  Demographic and regional controls include: 
dummies for marital status, a variable for the number of members in the household, three dummy variables 
for the census regions, and a missing census region dummy.  All estimates weight observations by 





















Table 1.9:  The Effect of Education on Unemployment Risk, By Race 
Dependent Variable: Variance of Weeks Unemployed 
OLS Estimates (Standard Errors) 
 
Race: White Black 
Model: (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
































































N 1263 1263 567 567 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data. * indicates that the coefficient is significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level.    ** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 
the 5% level.  All specifications also include a constant, age, age squared, a missing risk tolerance measure 
dummy, and a seven dummies for the years in included in the sample.  Demographic and regional controls 
include: dummies for marital status, a variable for the number of members in the household, three dummy 
variables for the census regions, and a missing census region dummy.  All estimates weight observations by 














Table 1.10:  The Effect of Preferences for Risk on Educational Attainment, By Race 
Dependent Variable: High School Graduate or More 
Probit Model Marginal Effect Estimates (Standard Errors) 
 
Race: White Black 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 


















































































Wealth Controls N N Linear Categorical N N Linear Categorical 
N 1138 1138 1138 1138 449 449 449 449 
Mean of High 





Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data. * indicates that the marginal effect is significantly different from zero at the 10% level.   ** indicates 
that the marginal effect is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  The sample is the 1992 cross-section.  All specifications also include age, age 
squared, three regional dummies and a missing region indicator dummy variable.  The omitted parent's education categories are no high school attendance.  The 
specifications (2), (3) and (4) also include dummy variables for missing mothers and fathers' education.  The specifications in (3) and (4) also include a missing 
wealth indicator dummy variable.  For these specifications the 14 observations (12 whites and 2 blacks) with a missing regional dummy predict success perfectly 




Table 1.11:  The Effect of Preferences for Risk on Educational Attainment, By Race 
Dependent Variable: Educational Attainment Category 
Ordered Probit Model Coefficient Estimates (Standard Errors) 
 
Race: White Black 
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 


















































































Wealth Controls N N Linear Categorical N N Linear Categorical 
N 1150 1150 1150 1150 451 451 451 451 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  * indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level.   ** indicates that 
the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  All specifications also include age, age squared, three regional dummies and a missing region 
indicator dummy variable.  The sample is the 1992 cross-section.  The omitted parent's education categories are no high school attendance.  The specifications 
(2), (3) and (4) also include dummy variables for missing mother and father’s education.  The specifications in (3) and (4) also include a missing wealth indicator 




Table 1.12:  The Effect of Preferences for Risk on Educational Attainment 
With Wealth Interactions, By Race 
Dependent Variable: Educational Attainment Category 
Ordered Probit Model Coefficient Estimates (Standard Errors) 
 
Race: White Black 
Model: (3) (3) (3) (3) 
 













Risk Aversion*  









Risk Aversion*  






















































N 1150 1150 451 451 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  * indicates that the coefficient is significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level.  ** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at 
the 5% level.  All specifications also include age, age squared, three regional dummies, a missing region 
indicator dummy, a missing wealth indicator variable and an interaction between missing wealth and risk 
aversion variable.  The sample is the 1992 cross-section.  The wealth category is high wealth.  The 
specifications (4) also include dummy variables for missing mother and father’s education.   All estimates 


















Table 1.A1: Sample Statistics 
 
Year: 1977 1992 
 











Log (Annual Labor + Social Insurance Income  







































































N 1830 1601 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data.  The entries in the table are means of the 
variables with the standard errors in parentheses.  All statistics are weighted by sampling weights.  All 
monetary variables are measured in 1992 dollars using the GDP consumption deflator
110 





Education: HS Dropout 
 











1978 214 1048 281 285 
1979 213 1051 268 296 
1980 210 1056 253 313 
1981 202 1066 248 322 
1982 197 1072 244 325 
1983 197 1072 235 336 
1984 214 1081 208 358 
1985 213 1079 208 359 
1986 209 1062 202 348 
1987 201 1048 197 338 
1988 197 1031 192 331 
1989 193 1025 184 327 
1990 187 1006 182 312 
1991 186 1002 175 308 
1992 181 969 164 287 
% change in observation 
counts between  
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Table 1.A3: Tabulation of Risk Aversion Measure, by Race and Education 
 
Race: White Black 











2.85 9 120 16 18 
3.57 12 125 7 28 
6.66 65 369 39 104 
Missing 
 
77 192 88 102 
Notes:  Source: Authors calculations using the PSID data for the 1992 cross-section.    
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According to (LOCAL JTPA PROGAM NAME) records, you applied to enter (LOCAL 
JTPA PROGRAM NAME) in (MONTH/YEAR OF RANDOM ASSIGNMENT).  Did 
you participate in the program after you applied? 
 
YES (SKIP TO D9) 




Do you think that the training or other assistance that you got from the program helped 






Source: JTPA First Follow-Up Study Survey Instrument 
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Table 2.1: Bivariate Results for the relationship between Experimental Impacts and Positive Self-Evaluation,  
































































































































































































Notes: Source: Authors’ calculations using the NJS data.  Values in the table are means for Positive Self-Evaluation, and experimental impacts for the eight 
outcomes.  The values in parentheses are standard errors and the values in square brackets are p-values.  Percentage Positive Self-Assessment is calculated as the 
mean of the binary indicator positive self-assessment variable for those who self-report participating and are in the treatment group.  Earnings one and 
employment one are earnings and any employment over the 18-months after random assignment using self-reported earnings data.  Earnings two and 
employment two are earnings and employment in month 18 after random assignment using self-reported earnings data.  Earnings three and employment three are 
earnings and any employment over the 18-months after random assignment using UI-reported earnings data.  Earnings four and employment four are earnings 
and employment in month 18 after random assignment using UI-reported earnings data.  Those with missing outcomes are dropped from the estimate for that 
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outcome only.
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Table 2.2A:  Bivariate results for the Correlation between Experimental Impacts and Self-Evaluation for Eight Outcomes,  






























































































































































































Overall: 24 of 48 (50 %); significant at 0.10: 4 of 48 (8 %); significant at 0.05: 3 of 48 (6 %) 
Negative Correlations 
Overall: 24 of 48 (50 %); significant at 0.10: 4 of 48 (8 %); significant at 0.05: 3 of 48 (6 %) 
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Notes: Source: Authors’ calculations using the NJS data.  Values in the table are the correlation between the mean of Positive Self-Evaluation, and the 
experimental impacts by subgroup.  The values in square brackets are p-values.  Percentage Positive Self-Evaluation is calculated as the mean of the binary 
indicator positive self-evaluation variable for those who self-report participating and are in the treatment group.  Earnings one and employment one are earnings 
and any employment over the 18-months after random assignment using self-reported earnings data.  Earnings two and employment two are earnings and 
employment in month 18 after random assignment using self-reported earnings data.  Earnings three and employment three are earnings and any employment 
over the 18-months after random assignment using UI-reported earnings data.  Earnings four and employment four are earnings and employment in month 18 
after random assignment using UI-reported earnings data.  Those with missing outcomes are dropped from the estimate for that outcome only.  The categories 
are defined as the following. Race: White, Black, Hispanic and Other.  Age: less than 19 years, 19-21 years, 22-25 years, 26-34 years and 35+ years.  Education: 
under 10 years, 10-11 years, 12 years, 13-15 years and 16+ years.  Marital Status: single, married, and divorced/widowed/separated.  Employment Status: out of 
labor force, unemployed, and employed.   Site: sixteen site categories. 
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Table 2.2B:  Bivariate results for the Correlation between Experimental Impacts and Self-Evaluation for Eight Outcomes,  






























































































































































































Overall: 28 of 48 (58 %); significant at 0.10: 0 of 48 (0 %); significant at 0.05: 0 of 48 (0 %) 
Negative Correlations 
Overall: 20 of 48 (42 %); significant at 0.10: 0 of 48 (0 %); significant at 0.05: 0 of 48 (0 %) 
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Notes: Source: Authors’ calculations using the NJS data.  Values in the table are the correlation between the mean of Positive Self-Evaluation, and the 
experimental impacts by subgroup.  The values in square brackets are p-values.  Percentage Positive Self-Evaluation is calculated as the mean of the binary 
indicator positive self-evaluation variable for those who self-report participating and are in the treatment group.  Earnings one and employment one are earnings 
and any employment over the 18-months after random assignment using self-reported earnings data.  Earnings two and employment two are earnings and 
employment in month 18 after random assignment using self-reported earnings data.  Earnings three and employment three are earnings and any employment 
over the 18-months after random assignment using UI-reported earnings data.  Earnings four and employment four are earnings and employment in month 18 
after random assignment using UI-reported earnings data.  Those with missing outcomes are dropped from the estimate for that outcome only.  The categories 
are defined as the following. Race: White, Black, Hispanic and Other.  Age: less than 19 years, 19-21 years, 22-25 years, 26-34 years and 35+ years.  Education: 
under 10 years, 10-11 years, 12 years, 13-15 years and 16+ years.  Marital Status: single, married, and divorced/widowed/separated.  Employment Status: out of 
labor force, unemployed, and employed.   Site: sixteen site categories. 
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Table 2.2C:  Bivariate results for the Correlation between Experimental Impacts and Self-Evaluation for Eight Outcomes,  



































































































































































Overall: 27 of 40 (68 %); significant at 0.10: 4 of 40 (10 %); significant at 0.05: 2 of 40 (5 %) 
Negative Correlations 
Overall: 13 of 40 (32 %); significant at 0.10: 2 of 40 (5 %); significant at 0.05: 0 of 40 (0 %) 
Notes: Source: Authors’ calculations using the NJS data.  Values in the table are the correlation between the mean of Positive Self-Evaluation, and the 
experimental impacts by subgroup.  The values in square brackets are p-values.  Percentage Positive Self-Evaluation is calculated as the mean of the binary 
indicator positive self-evaluation variable for those who self-report participating and are in the treatment group.  Earnings one and employment one are earnings 
and any employment over the 18-months after random assignment using self-reported earnings data.  Earnings two and employment two are earnings and 
employment in month 18 after random assignment using self-reported earnings data.  Earnings three and employment three are earnings and any employment 
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over the 18-months after random assignment using UI-reported earnings data.  Earnings four and employment four are earnings and employment in month 18 
after random assignment using UI-reported earnings data.  Those with missing outcomes are dropped from the estimate for that outcome only.  The categories 
are defined as the following.  Race: White, Black, Hispanic and Other.  Education: under 10 years, 10-11 years, 12 years, 13-15 years and 16+ years.  Marital 
Status: single, married, and divorced/widowed/separated.  Employment Status: out of labor force, unemployed, and employed.   Site: sixteen site categories. 
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Table 2.2D:  Bivariate results for the Correlation between Experimental Impacts and Self-Evaluation for Eight Outcomes,                

































































































































































Overall: 19 of 40 (47 %); significant at 0.10: 2 of 40 (5 %); significant at 0.05: 2 of 40 (5 %) 
Negative Correlations 
Overall: 21 of 40 (53 %); significant at 0.10: 8 of 40 (20 %); significant at 0.05: 8 of 40 (20 %) 
Notes: Source: Authors’ calculations using the NJS data.  Values in the table are the correlation between the mean of Positive Self-Evaluation, and the 
experimental impacts by subgroup.  The values in square brackets are p-values.  Percentage Positive Self-Evaluation is calculated as the mean of the binary 
indicator positive self-evaluation variable for those who self-report participating and are in the treatment group.  Earnings one and employment one are earnings 
and any employment over the 18-months after random assignment using self-reported earnings data.  Earnings two and employment two are earnings and 
employment in month 18 after random assignment using self-reported earnings data.  Earnings three and employment three are earnings and any employment 
over the 18-months after random assignment using UI-reported earnings data.  Earnings four and employment four are earnings and employment in month 18 
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after random assignment using UI-reported earnings data.  Those with missing outcomes are dropped from the estimate for that outcome only.  The categories 
are defined as the following.  Race: White, Black, Hispanic and Other.  Education: under 10 years, 10-11 years, 12 years, 13-15 years and 16+ years.  Marital 
Status: single, married, and divorced/widowed/separated.  Employment Status: out of labor force, unemployed, and employed.   Site: sixteen site categories. 
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Table 2.3:  Regression results for the relationship between Predicted Impacts and Positive Self-Evaluation for Eight Outcomes,  











 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 



























































































Any Employment (UI)  




































































Negative (overall / 0.10 / 0.05) 
 
8/1/1 6/0/0 2/1/0 3/0/0 6/0/0 2/0/0 5/2/2 3/0/0 
Notes: Source: Authors’ calculations using the NJS data.  Each cell in the table is a coefficient estimate from the regression of the estimated impacts for an 
individual (based on their X) as the dependent variable and self-evaluation as the independent variable.  The population used is the treatment sample.  The values 
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in parentheses are the heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors.  The values in the bottom two rows are the counts of the number of cells in the column above 
which are positive or negative, and counts of those that are significantly different from zero at the 10% and 5% levels.  Specification (1) selects the set of X’s 
used to predict the impacts for each individual by a stepwise procedure.  Specification (2) uses the specification of X’ s used in Heckman, Heinrich and Smith 
(2003) (HHS) to predict the impacts for each individual.  The HHS set of X’s contains: are race, age, education, marital status, employment status, AFDC receipt, 
receipt of food stamps and site. 
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Table 2.4:  Relationship between Quantile Treatment Effects for 18-Month Earnings and the Percent with Positive  
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Notes: Source: Authors’ calculations using the NJS data.  The values in the left column of the upper panel for each demographic group are quantile treatment 
effects estimates with standard errors in parentheses for five quantiles.  The values in the right column of the upper panel for each demographic group are the 
means of the binary positive self-evaluation indicator variable for each quantile of the outcome distribution for those in the treatment group.  The first row of the 
lower panel contains the correlation between the treatment effect estimates and the percentage positive self-evaluation by quantile (where one observation is one 
of the 20 quantiles) and the p-value for the correlation is in square brackets.  The second row of the lower panel contains the coefficient of the regression with 
percentage positive self-evaluation as the independent variable and the treatment effect estimate as the dependant variable (where one observation is one of the 
20 quantiles).  The hetero-skedastic consistent standard errors for these estimates appear in parentheses.   
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Table 2.5:  Logit Estimates of the Determinants of Positive Self-Evaluation,  







































































































































































English Language 0.051 0.106 0.135 -0.058 
 






























































































































































































Notes: Source: Authors’ calculations using the NJS data.  Columns two through five of the table report the 
results from a logit model where the binary positive self-evaluation variable is the dependant variable and 
the categorical variables listed in column one are the independent variables.  The values in the table are 
mean numerical derivatives, with the standard errors in parentheses and  p-values in square brackets.  The 
population for these regressions is the treatment sample.  Indicator variables for missing values for the 
independent variables are also included in the regression.  The omitted age category for adults is age 22-25 
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years and is age less than 19 for youths.  The omitted marital status is single, the omitted education 
category is less than 10 years, the omitted racial group is white, and the omitted training type for both self-
report and administrative report is no training for all demographic groups. 
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Notes: Source: Authors’ calculations using the NJS data.  Columns two through five of the table report the results from a logit model where the binary positive 
self-evaluation variable is the dependent variable and the categorical variables summarized in column one are the independent variables.  The values in the table 
are χ2-statistics for joint tests that all of the coefficients equal zero for a given group of variables, with the p-values in square brackets.  The population for these 
regressions is the treatment sample.  The variables in ‘Other Individual Characteristics’ are AFDC receipt, child less than six indicator, and worked for pay 
indicator.  Indicator variables for missing values for the independent variables are also included in the regressions. 
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Table 2.7:  Logit Estimates of the Relationship between Outcomes and Positive  
















Earnings over 18 































































Earnings over 18 













Earnings over 18 
Months Bottom 













Earnings over 18 
Months Lower 













Earnings over 18 
Months Upper 


















































Notes: Source: Authors’ calculations using the NJS data.  Columns two through five of this table report the 
results from logit regressions where the binary positive self-evaluation variable is the dependant variable 
and the categorical variables listed in column one of Table 5 are the independent variables, in addition an 
outcome variable is included in each regression.  The values in the table are mean numerical derivatives, 
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with the standard errors in parentheses and p-values in square brackets.  For earnings outcomes the 
continuous variables are entered as four categorical variables: zero earnings, an indicator for being in the 
lowest quartile of the non-zero earnings distribution, lower middle quartile of the non-zero earnings 
distribution, upper middle quartile of the non-zero earnings distribution.  The omitted category is for those 
with earnings in the highest quartile of the non-zero earnings distribution.  For the employment outcomes a 
binary variable is included indicating whether the respondent was employed or not.  Each set of cells in the 
table is the result for a different specification where the outcome to be included as an independent variable 
is different. The sets of cells are defined as two groups of four and two groups of two depending on how 
the outcome enters the regression.  The population for these regressions is the treatment sample.  Indicator 
variables for missing values for the independent variables are also included in the regression.
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Table 2.8: Test Statistics from Logit Models of the Relationship between Outcomes and Positive Self-Evaluation,  















































































































Employment in the Quarter of the Survey 3.45 0.24 10.59 0.82 
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(UI) [0.178] [0.889] [0.005] [0.664] 
Notes: Source: Authors’ calculations using the NJS data.  Columns two through five of this table report the results from logit models where the binary positive 
self-evaluation variable is the dependant variable and the categorical variables listed in column one of Table 5 are the independent variables, in addition an 
outcome variable is included in each regression.  Each cell in the table is the result for a different specification where the outcome to be included as an 
independent variable is different.  The values in the table are χ2-Statistics for joint tests that all of the coefficients are zero for a given outcome, with the p-values 
in square brackets.   For earnings outcomes the continuous variables are entered as four categorical variables: zero earnings, an indicator for being in the lowest 
quartile of the non-zero earnings distribution, lower middle quartile of the non-zero earnings distribution, upper middle quartile of the non-zero earnings 
distribution.  The omitted category is for those with earnings in the highest quartile of the non-zero earnings distribution.  For the employment outcomes a binary 
variable is included indicating whether the respondent was employed or not.  The population for these regressions is the treatment sample.  Indicator variables for 






Table 2.9: Logit Estimates of the Relationship between Before-After  
      Self-Reported Earnings Changes and Positive Self-Evaluation,  




















































































Notes: Source: Authors’ calculations using the NJS data.  “Before-After Self-Reported Earnings” 
consists of monthly self-reported earnings over the 18 months after random assignment minus monthly 
self-reported earnings in the 12 months prior to random assignment.  The estimates come from logit 
models with an indicator for a positive self-evaluation as the dependent variable and the before-after 
earnings change variable and the categorical variables listed in column one of Table 5 as independent 
variables.  The values in the table are mean numerical derivatives, with standard errors in parentheses 
and p-values in square brackets.  The before-after earnings changes enter in the form of indicator 
variables for being in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles of the before-after earnings change distribution.  
The omitted category is the 1st quintile of the distribution.  The population for these regressions is the 
treatment group.  Indicator variables for missing values for the independent variables are also included 

















Table 2.10: Logit Estimates of the Relationship between Before-After UI  
        Earnings Changes and Positive Self-Evaluation,  


























































































































Before-After UI (2) 
Reported Earnings 














Before-After UI (2) 
Reported Earnings 














Notes: Source: Authors’ Calculations using the NJS data.  “Before–After UI Reported Earnings” 
consist of monthly UI earnings in the six quarters after random assignment minus monthly UI earnings 
in the 18 months before random assignment.  “Before-After UI (2) Reported Earnings” consist of 
monthly UI earnings in the 6th quarter after random assignment minus monthly UI earnings in the 6th 




positive self-evaluation as the dependent variable and the before-after earnings change variable and the 
categorical variables listed in column one of Table 5 as independent variables.  The values in the table 
are mean numerical derivatives, with standard errors in parentheses and p-values in square brackets.  
The before-after earnings changes enter in the form of indicator variables for being in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 
and 5th quintiles of the before-after earnings change distribution.  The omitted category is the 1st 
quintile of the distribution.  The population for these regressions is the treatment group.  Indicator 













































Table 2.11: Logit Estimates of the Relationship between Before-After  
        Employment Status Changes and Positive Self-Evaluation,  



































































Notes: Source: Authors’ calculations using the NJS data.   Employment status changes are based on 
changes in self-reported employment status measured at the date of random assignment and 18 months 
after random assignment.  The omitted category is always employed.  The estimates come from logit 
models with an indicator for a positive self-evaluation as the dependent variable and the before-after 
employment change variable and the categorical variables listed in column one of Table 5 as 
independent variables.  The values in the table are mean numerical derivatives, with standard errors in 
parentheses and p-values in square brackets.   The population for these regressions is the treatment 


























Table 2.12: Test Statistics from Logit Models of the Relationship between  
        Before-After Estimates and Positive Self-Evaluation,  
































































Notes: Source: Authors’ Calculations using the NJS data.  The values in the table are χ2-Statistics for 
joint tests of the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients equal zero for a given outcome, with the p-
values in square brackets.   The tests correspond to the estimates presented in Tables 9, 10 and 11.  See 


























Table 2.13: Logit Estimates of the Relationship between Positive Self-Evaluation         























































































































































































































Notes: Source: Authors’ calculations using the NJS data.  The JTPA performance measures consist of  
(1) employment at JTPA termination date; (2) employment at follow-up, which is 13 weeks after 
termination in JTPA; (3) wage per hour at termination date (conditional on employment) in dollars; 
and (4) the average total weekly earnings at follow up (conditional on employment).  Our construction 
of all of the JTPA performance measures relies on self-reported data.  The WIA performance measures 
consist of (1) employment at exit, which we calculate as non-zero UI earnings in the calendar quarter 
of termination (conditional on non-employment at the date of random assignment based on self-
reported labor force status);  (2) employment at six months after termination, which we calculate as 
non-zero UI earnings in the third calendar quarter after termination (conditional on employment in the 
first quarter after termination);  (3) earnings differences (conditional on employment in the first quarter 
after termination), which we calculate as the sum of UI earnings in the second and third calendar 
quarters after program termination minus the sum of earnings in the two calendar quarters prior to 
random assignment.  The estimates in the table correspond to logit models with an indicator for a 
positive self-evaluation as the dependent variable and one of the performance measures as the only 
independent variable.  The models also include all of the variables listed in Table 5 as additional 
covariates.  The values in the table are mean numerical derivatives, with standard errors in parentheses 
and p-values in square brackets.  We multiply the values for the earnings-based performance measures 
by 100 for ease of presentation.  The final row in each cell gives the sample size for the sample used to 
produce each estimate.  Before deleting observations with missing values of the performance 
measures, the treatment group samples contain 3067 adult males, 3922 adult females, 1308 male 







































Figure 2.1A: Quantile Treatment Effects and Percentage Reporting 
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Notes: Source: Authors’ Calculations using the JTPA data.  The outcome used here is self-reported 





















Figure 2.1B: Quantile Treatment Effects and Percentage Reporting 
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Notes: Source: Authors’ Calculations using the JTPA data.  The outcome used here is self-reported 


















Figure 2.1C: Quantile Treatment Effects and Percentage Reporting 
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Notes: Source: Authors’ Calculations using the JTPA data.  The outcome used here is self-reported 


















Figure 2.1D: Quantile Treatment Effects and Percentage Reporting 
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Notes: Source: Authors’ Calculations using the JTPA data.  The outcome used here is self-reported 






Abadie, Alberto, Joshua Angrist and Guido Imbens (2002). “Instrumental Variables 
Estimates of the Effect of Subsidized Training on the Quantiles of Trainee Earnings.” 
Econometrica. 70(1): 91-117. 
 
Abbring, Japp, James Heckman and Edward Vytlacil (2005) “Econometric 
Evaluation of Social Programs” in James Heckman and Edward Leamer (eds.) 
Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 6. Amsterdam: North-Holland: forthcoming. 
 
Abowd, John and David Card (1989) "On The Covariance Structure of Earnings and 
Hours Changes." Econometrica, 57(2), 411-445. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron and Joshua Angrist (2000) "How Large are Human-Capital 
Externalities?  Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Laws." NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual, 15, 9-59. 
 
Angrist, Joshua (2004) “Treatment Effect Heterogeneity in Theory and Practice.” 
Economic Journal 114(494): C52-C83. 
 
Ainger, Dennis and Glen Cain (1977) "Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor 
Markets." Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 30(2), 175-187. 
 
Altonji, Joseph and Rebecca Black (1999) "Race and Gender in the Labor Market." in 
O. Ashenfelter and D. Card eds. Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3, 3143-
3251. 
 
Altonji, Joseph and Charles R. Pierret (2001) "Employer Learning and Statistical 
Discrimination." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 383-341. 
 
Attanasio, Orazio and Stephen Davis (1996) "Relative Wage Movements and the 
Distribution of Consumption." Journal of Political Economy, 104(6), 1227-1262. 
 
Autor, David and David Scarborough (2005) "Will Job Testing Harm Minority 
Workers?  Evidence From the Retail Sector." Working Paper, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Barnow, Burt and Jeffrey Smith (2004) “Performance Management of U.S. Job 
Training Programs: Lessons from the Job Training Partnership Act.” Public Finance 
and Management 4(3): 247-287. 
 
Barsky, Robert, Thomas Juster and Miles Kimball (1997) "Preference Parameters and 
Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the Health and Retirement 





Benabou, Roland (2002) "Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous Agent 
Economy: What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Efficiency?" 
Econometrica, 70(Mar), 481-518.  
 
Bertola, Guiseppe (2004) "A Pure Theory of Job Security and Labor Income Risk." 
Review of Economic Studies, 71, 43-61. 
 
Bitler, Marianne, Jonah Gelbach and Hilary Hoynes (2004) “What Mean Impacts 
Miss: Distributional Effects of Welfare Reform Experiments.” Unpublished 
manuscript, University of Maryland. 
 
Black, Sandra E. and Amir Sufi (2002) "Who Goes to College? Differential 
Enrollment by Race and Family Background." Working Paper 9310, National Bureau 
of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Bloom, Howard, Larry Orr, George Cave, Stephen Bell and Fred Doolittle (1993) The 
National JTPA Study: Title II-A Impacts on Earnings and Employment at 18 Months. 
Bethesda, MD: Abt Associates. 
 
Bloom, Howard, Larry Orr, Stephen Bell, George Cave, Fred Doolittle, Winston Lin, 
and Johannes Bos (1997) “The Benefits and Costs of JTPA Title II-A Programs: 
Findings from the National Job Training Partnership Act Study.” Journal of Human 
Resources 32: 549-576. 
 
Bound, John and Richard B. Freedman (1992) "What Went Wrong? The Erosion of 
Relative Earnings and Employment Among Young Black Men In The 1980s."  
Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 201-232. 
 
Bound, John and Alan Krueger (1991) "Measurement Error in Longitudinal Earnings 
Data:  Do Two Wrongs Make A Right?" Journal of Labor Economics, 9(1), 1-24. 
 
Bound, John, Charles Brown, Greg J. Duncan and William L. Rodgers (1994) 
"Evidence on the Validity of Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Labor-Market Data." 
Journal of Labor Economics, 12(3), 345-368. 
 
Bound, John, Micheal Schoenbaum and Timothy Waidmann (1995) "Disability Status 
and Racial Differences in Labor Force Attachment." Journal of Human Resources, 
S227-S267. 
 
Brunnermeier, Markus K. (2004) "Learning to Re-optimize Consumption at New 
Income Levels: A Rationale for Prospect Theory." Journal of European Economic 
Association, 2(1), 98-114. 
 
Brunnermeier, Markus K. and Stefan Nagel (2005) "Do Wealth Fluctuations Generate 
Time-varying Risk Aversion?  Micro-Evidence on Individuals' Asset Allocation." 





Caballero, Ricardo J. (1991) "Earnings Uncertainty and Aggregate Wealth 
Accumulation." American Economic Review, 81(4), 859-871. 
 
Cameron, Stephen and James Heckman (2001) "The Dynamics of Educational 
Attainment for Black, Hispanic and White Males." Journal of Political Economy, 
109(3), 455-499. 
 
Carneiro, Pedro, Karsten Hansen and James Heckman (2003) "Estimating 
Distributions of Treatment Effects with an Application to the Returns to Schooling 
and Measurement of the Effects of Uncertainty on College Choice."  International 
Economic Review, 44(2), 361-423. 
 
Carniero, Pedro, James Heckman and Edward Vytlacil (2005) “Understanding What 
Instrumental Variables Estimate: Estimating Marginal and Average Returns to 
Education.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago. 
 
Carroll, Christopher and Andrew Samwick (1997) "The Nature of Precautionary 
Wealth." Journal of Monetary Economics, 40(1), 41-77. 
 
Charles, Kerwin and Eric Hurst (2003) "The Correlation of Wealth Across 
Generations." Journal of Political Economy, 111(6), 1155-1182.  
 
Charles, Kerwin and Ming-Ching Louh (2003) "Gender Differences in Completed 
Schooling." The Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(3), 559-577.  
 
Chen, Stacey (2004) "Estimating the Variance of Wages in the Presence of Selection 
and Unobservable Heterogeneity."  Working Paper, State University of New York at 
Albany, Albany NY. 
 
Coate, Stephen and Glenn Loury (1993) "Will Affirmative Action Eliminate Negative 
Stereotypes?" American Economic Review, December, 1220-1240.   
 
Cochrane, John (1991) "A Simple Test for Consumption Insurance." Journal of 
Political Economy, 99(5), 957-976. 
 
Cunha, Flavio, James Heckman and Salvador Navarro (2005) "Separating 
Uncertainty From Heterogeneity in Life Cycle Earnings." Working Paper 11024, 
National Burea of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Datcher-Loury (1986) "Racial Differences in the Stability of High Earnings among 
Young Men." Journal of Labor Economics, 4(July), 301-316. 
 
Devine, Theresa, and Heckman, James (1996) “The Structure and Consequences of 
Eligibility Rules for a Social Program” in Solomon Polachek (ed.) Research in Labor 





Dominitz, Jeff and Charles Manski (1996) “Eliciting Student Expectations of the 
Returns to Schooling.” Journal of Human Resources. 31(1): 1-26. 
 
Doolittle, Fred, and Linda Traeger (1990) Implementing the National JTPA Study. 
New York, NY: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. 
 
Dunnett, Charles and Ajit Tamhane (1992) “A Step-Up Multiple Test Procedure.” 
Journal of the American Statistical Association 87(417): 162-170. 
 
Dynan, Karen, Jonathan Skinner and Stephen P. Zeldes (2004) "Why Do the Rich 
Save More?" Journal of Political Economy, 112(2), 397-444. 
 
Dynarski, Susan and Jonathan Gruber (1997) "Can Families Smooth Variable 
Earnings?" Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1997(1), 229-303. 
 
Engen, Eric and Jonathan Gruber (2001) "Unemployment Insurance and 
Precautionary Savings." Journal of Monetary Economics, 47(3), 545-579. 
 
Fairlie, Robert and Lori Kletzer (1998) "Jobs Lost, Jobs Regained:  An Analysis of 
Black/White Differences in Job Displacement in the 1980s." Industrial Relations, 
37(4), 460-475. 
 
Farber, Henry (1993) "The Incidence and Costs of Job Loss: 1982-1991." Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1, 73-119. 
 
Farber, Henry and Robert Gibbons (1996) "Learning and Wage Dynamics." 
Quarterly Journal of Economics,111(4), p.1007-47. 
 
Fitzgerald, John, Peter Gotteschalk and Robert Moffitt (1998) "An Analysis of 
Sample Attrition in Panel Data: The Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics." 
Journal of Human Resources, Spring, 251-299.  
 
Fuchs-Schundeln, Nicola and Matthias Schundeln (2005) "Precautionary Savings and 
Self-Selection - Evidence from the German Reunification 'Experiment'." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 120(3), 1085-1120. 
 
Galipolli, Giovanni, Costas Meghir, and Gianluca Violante (2005) "Education 
Decisions, Equilibrium Policies and Wages Dispersion."  Working Paper, University 
College - London, London, UK. 
 
Greenberg, David (1997) “The Leisure Bias in Cost-Benefit Analyses of Employment 
and Training Programs.” Journal of Human Resources 32(2): 413-439. 
 
Greenberg, David and Daniel Shroder (2004) Digest of the Social Experiments, Third 





Goldin, Claudia and Lawrence Katz (2003) "Mass Secondary Schooling and the 
State." Working Paper 10075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 
MA. 
 
Gottschalk, Peter and Robert Moffit (1994) "The Growth of Earnings Instability in 
the U.S. Labor Market." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 207-250. 
 
Heckman, James (1997a). “Instrumental Variables: A Study of the Implicit 
Behavioral Assumptions Used in Making Program Evaluations.” Journal of Human 
Resources 32(3): 441-452. 
 
Heckman, James (1997b) “Randomization as an Instrumental Variable.” Review of 
Economics and Statistics 78(2): 336-341.  
 
Heckman, James and Carolyn Heinrich, eds. (2005) Performance Standards in a 
Government Bureaucracy. W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
 
Heckman, James, Carolyn Heinrich, and Jeffrey Smith (2002) “The Performance of 
Performance Standards.” Journal of Human Resources 36(4): 778-811. 
 
Heckman, James, Neil Hohmann, Jeffrey Smith, with the assistance of Michael Khoo. 
(2000) “Substitution and Drop Out Bias in Social Experiments: A Study of an 
Influential Social Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(2): 651-694. 
 
Heckman, James, Lance Lochner and Petra Todd (2005) "Earnings Functions, Rates 
of Return, and Treatment Effects:  The Mincer Equation and Beyond." Working 
Paper 11544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Heckman, James, Robert LaLonde, and Jeffrey Smith (1999) “The Economics and 
Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs” in Orley Ashenfelter and David 
Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3A.  Amsterdam: North-Holland, 
1865-2097. 
 
Heckman, James and Jeffrey Smith (1998) “Evaluating the Welfare State” in Steiner 
Strom (ed.), Econometrics and Economic Theory in the 20th Century: The Ragnar 
Frisch Centennial.  Cambridge University Press for Econometric Society Monograph 
Series, 241-318. 
 
Heckman, James, and Jeffrey Smith (1999) “The Pre-Program Earnings Dip and the 
Determinants of Participation in a Social Program: Implications for Simple Program 
Evaluation Strategies.” Economic Journal 109(457): 313-348. 
 
Heckman, James, and Jeffrey Smith (2000) “The Sensitivity of Experimental Impact 




Richard Freeman (eds.), Youth Employment and Joblessness in Advanced Countries, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press for NBER, 331-356. 
 
Heckman, James, and Jeffrey Smith (2004) “The Determinants of Participation in a 
Social Program: Evidence from the Job Training Partnership Act.” Journal of Labor 
Economics 22(4): 243-298. 
 
Heckman, James, Jeffrey Smith, with the assistance of Nancy Clements (1997) 
“Making the Most Out of Programme Evaluations and Social Experiments: 
Accounting for Heterogeneity in Programme Impacts.” Review of Economic Studies 
64(4): 487-535. 
 
Heckman, James and Edward Vytlacil (2005) “Structural Equations, Treatment 
Effects and Econometric Policy Evaluation. Econometrica, forthcoming. 
 
Heinrich, Carolyn, Gerald Marschke and Annie Zhang. (1998) “Using Administrative 
Data to Estimate the Cost-Effectiveness of Social Program Services.”  Technical 
report. The University of Chicago. 
 
Jacob, Brian and Lars Lofgren (2005) “Principals as Agents: Subjective Performance 
Measurement in Education.” NBER Working Paper No. 11463. 
 
Kornfeld, Robert and Howard Bloom (1999) “Measuring Program Impacts on 
Earnings and Employment: Do Unemployment Insurance Wage Reports From 
Employers Agree With Surveys of Individuals?” Journal of Labor Economics 17(1): 
168-197. 
 
Kemple, James, Fred Doolittle, and John Wallace (1993) The National JTPA Study: 
Site Characteristics and Participation Patterns. New York, NY: Manpower 
Demonstration Research Corporation. 
 
Kirschenman, Joleen and Kathryn Neckerman (1991) "'We'd Love to Hire Them, 
But': The Meaning of Race for Employers." in Christopher Jencks and Paul Peterson, 
eds., The Urban Underclass, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC. 
 
Lang, Kevin and Micheal Manove (2005) "Education and Labor-Market 
Discrimination." Working Paper, Boston University, Boston, MA. 
 
Lochner, Lance and Enrico Moretti (2004) "The Effect of Education on Crime: 
Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests and Self-Reports." American Economic 
Review, 94(1), 155-189. 
 
Lochner, Lance and Alexander Monge-Naranjo (2002) "Endogenous Credit 
Constraints and Education Formation." Working Paper 8815, National Bureau of 





Liu, Wei (1997) “Stepwise Tests When the Test Statistics Are Independent.” 
Australian Journal of Statistics 39(2): 169-177. 
 
Manski, Charles (1990) “The Use of Intentions Data to Predict Behavior: A Best-
Case Analysis.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 85(412): 934-940. 
 
Manski, Charles (2004) “Measuring Expectations.” Econometrica 72(5): 1329-1376. 
 
Mazzocco, Maurizio (2004) "Saving, Risk Sharing and Preferences for Risk." 
American Economic Review, 94(4), 1169-1182. 
 
McCurdy, Thomas E. (1982) "The Use of Time Series Processes to Model the Error 
Structure of Earnings in a Longitudinal Data Analysis." Journal of Econometrics, 83, 
83-114. 
 
Meghir, Costas and Luigi Pistaferri (2004) "Income Variance Dynamics and 
Heterogeneity." Econometrica, 72(1), 1-32. 
 
Neal, Derek (2005) "Has Black-White Skill Convergence Stopped?" Working Paper 
11090, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Neal, Derek and William Johnson (1996) "The Role of Premarket Factors in Black-
White Wage Differences." Journal of Political Economy, 104(5), 869-895. 
 
Orr, Larry, Howard Bloom, Stephen Bell, Winston Lin, George Cave and Fred 
Doolittle (1994) The National JTPA Study: Impacts, Benefits and Costs of Title II-A. 
Bethesda, MD: Abt Associates. 
 
Orr, Larry, Howard Bloom, Stephen Bell, Fred Doolittle, Winston Lin, and George 
Cave (1996) Does Training Work for the Disadvantaged? Evidence from the National 
JTPA Study. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press. 
 
Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio (2003) "An Empirical Analysis of the Risk Properties of 
Education Returns." American Economic Review, 93(3), 948-964. 
 
Philipson, Tomas and Larry Hedges (1998) “Subject Evaluation in Social 
Experiments.” Econometrica 66(2): 381-408. 
 
Rivkin, Stephen (1995) "Black/White Differences in Schooling and Employment."  
Journal of Human Resources, XXX(4), 826-852. 
 
Roy, A. D. (1951) “Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings.” Oxford 





Skyt Nielsen, Helena and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2005) "The Impact of Labor 
Income Risk on Educational Choices:  Estimates and Implied Risk Aversion." 
Working Paper, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.  
 
Smith, Jeffrey (1997a) “Measuring Earnings Dynamics Among the Poor: Evidence 
from Two Samples of JTPA Eligibles.” Unpublished manuscript, University of 
Western Ontario.  
 
Smith, Jeffrey (1997b) “Measuring Earnings Levels Among the Poor: Evidence from 
Two Samples of JTPA Eligibles.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Western 
Ontario. 
 
Smith, Jeffrey and Alexander Whalley (2005) “How Well Do We Measure Public Job 
Training?” Unpublished manuscript, University of Maryland. 
 
Wood, Michelle. 2005. “National JTPA Study – SDA Unit Costs.” Abt Associates 
Memo to Jerry Marsky [sic] and Larry Orr. 
 
 
